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  Abstract 
  
 
This thesis considers the rise and fall of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, 
a radical social movement located at the praxical intersection of Black Nationalism and 
Marxism. It traces the activities of this movement chronologically and identifies the external 
and internal factors that led to its demobilization. By consulting primary and archival 
sources, I identify two external factors of demobilization, resource deprivation and 
repression, and one internal factor of demobilization, factionalization. It is concluded that as 
repression and resource deprivation by the auto companies, the UAW, and local police forces 
succeeded in diminishing plant-level organization and activity, the League succumbed to 
increasing tactical and ideological factionalization. This allows me to infer that external 
factors were the primary and internal factors the secondary causes of the League’s 
demobilization. Whereas unions are typically seen as agents of worker mobilization, I show 
that the UAW instead colluded with the companies to demobilize the League.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 The League of Revolutionary Black Workers struggled against racism, exploitation, 
and imperialism at the peak of the Black Power Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
They emerged from the establishment in Detroit of Revolutionary Union Movements seeking 
unions that engage in militant class struggle, particularly by and for Black workers, and 
Marxist-Leninist newspapers.  While the League extended beyond the auto industry, to postal 
workers, health workers, and public transit workers, among others, and to other geographical 
areas, including Chicago, and New Jersey, the majority of its base remained Black 
automobile workers in the city of Detroit.  The League and its constituents faced many 
external enemies including the “big three” auto companies, Ford, Chrysler, and GM, the 
UAW, and the state including the Detroit Police Department and the FBI.  Strategically, they 
believed that since the UAW had continually let down workers generally and Black workers 
specifically there needed to be a union movement external to the UAW bureaucracy to 
represent the interests and needs of Black workers.  Tactically, the Revolutionary Union 
Movements targeted the point of production through wildcat strikes, and the union through 
protests and running radical candidates in predominantly Black locals.  Furthermore, radical 
newspaper editors and students produced newspapers, newsletters and other propaganda in 
order to inform Black workers and their communities of injustices from the intersection of 
national oppression and capitalist exploitation.  The League believed in change through 
praxis rather than ideology. 
 Only three major scholarly works discuss the League in detail: James A. 
Geschwender’s Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers (1977), Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin’s Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in 
	  	  
2 
Urban Revolution (1975), and Ernie Allen’s “Dying From the Inside: The Decline of the 
League of Revolutionary Black Workers” (1979). Each of these works emphasizes some 
internal mechanism as the primary factor in the demobilization of the League.1 
 Sociologist James A. Geschwender traced an intricate history of the Detroit Black 
workers’ movement before, during and after the existence of the League.  In his analysis 
Geschwender contributes the demobilization of the League primarily to what he refers to as 
“ideological strain” between Black Nationalists who emphasized Black cultural, economic, 
and political equality, while holding variable ideological positions on capitalism,2 and 
Marxist-Leninists concerned with combating the surplus exploitation of Black workers.  As 
an example he points to Black Nationalist rejection of white lawyers brought in to defend 
Black workers who were fired in the wake of a wildcat strike.  Geschwender also considers 
the contribution of tactical schisms stemming around the question of plant organizing or 
community organizing to demobilization.  Despite this, he spends a significant portion of the 
book discussing repression of the League, and while he certainly does not discount its 
importance, he concludes that “[t]he League might have been able to survive its external 
enemies if it had been internally sound.  It is doubtful if it could have survived its internal 
contradictions even in the absence of external enemies”.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James A. Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary 
Black Workers (London, Cambridge University Press, 1977). Dan Georgakas and Marvin 
Surkin, Detroit: I do Mind Dying, A Study in Urban Revolution, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2012). And, Ernie Allen, “Dying From the Inside: The Decline of the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers, in They Should Have Served that Cup of Coffee: Seven 
Radical Remember the ‘60s edited by Dick Cluster, 71-109, (Boston: South End Press, 
1979). 
2 While it seems clear that none of the League leadership tacitly accepted capitalism the rank-
and-file seems to hold variable positions ranging from “socialist” to “indifferent” to the class 
question. I doubt if any League or RUM members were adamantly pro-capitalism. 
3 Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 174-182. 
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Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin  produce a narrative of the Black liberation 
movement in Detroit during the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on the Dodge 
Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and the League.  They use primary accounts to 
show how Black workers’ movements struggle against the established power structures of the 
state, massive corporations, and indoctrinated unions.  Although their narrative is similar to 
Geschwender’s, Georgakas and Surkin attribute the fall of the League to a lack of 
organization and a collapse in personal loyalties, or personality factionalism.  They state, 
“one of the ever-present dilemmas during the first year of League operations was whether to 
answer a new inquiry or to devote extra time to an existing RUM (Revolutionary Union 
Movement).  The League leadership’s time and energy were spread thin and the 
organization’s structure was as fragile as a pyramid of playing cards”.4  Furthermore, while 
Georgakas and Surkin may have agreed with Geschwender that political disagreements 
weakened the League, they were not detrimental until they led to antagonistic rivalries 
between League leaders.  The seven-man League Executive Committee split into three 
factional groups that participated in a brief but destructive polemic.  The group made up of 
Matt Watson, Ken Cockrel, and Mike Hamlin was labeled bourgeois because of their 
emphasis on political education and projects outside of the plant.  Another group made up of 
General Baker and Chuck Wooten was labeled “paternalistic to workers,” while the third 
faction made up of ex-Detroit Black Panther Party leaders, John Williams and Luke Tripp 
was said to lack “imagination”.5 
A third explanation of the League’s demobilization written by former League Central 
Staff member Ernie Allen emphasizes the League’s structural and organizational weakness.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I do Mind Dying, 71. 
5 Ibid., 133-34. 
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Despite its profession of democratic centralism, the League lacked “any structural 
possibilities for the general membership to impose its collective will on either the overall 
political direction of the League or its internal affairs”.6  He blamed “an extremely lax 
organizational structure” lacking capacity “whereby leadership could communicate its 
concrete political experiences to the rank-and-file” or a “formal mechanism developed in 
order that the organization might collectively and systematically analyze itself”.7  He 
ultimately concluded that the League was caught in the structural contradiction of 
simultaneously attempting to build a vanguard party and a mass organization.8 
 The League situates itself at the praxical intersection of Black Nationalism and 
Marxism-Leninism.  While these ideologies may harbor contradictions in their articulations 
of race and class intersectionality the League sought to resolve them on the terrain of 
struggle, rather than the terrain of scholarly reflection.  Still, it will be of use to us to briefly 
explore three articulations of Black Nationalist and Marxist theories of race.  For this task I 
have identified three foundational works to examine: Harold Cruse’s The Crisis of the Negro 
Intellectual which set the stage for academic debate over Black Nationalism, Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant’s Racial Formation in the United States which claims that race must be 
treated as a category independent of class, nation, or ethnicity, and Theodore W. Allen’s The 
Invention of the White Race, which proposes a Marxist/class oriented understanding of race.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Allen, “Dying From the Inside”, 80. 
7 Ibid., 87-90. 
8 Ibid., 95.  
9 Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Historical Analysis of the Failure of 
Black Leadership, 1967 repr. (New York: New York Review Books, 2005). Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 
2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 1994). Theodore W. Allen, Racial Oppression and Social 
Control, Vol. 1 of The Invention of the White Race, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2012).  And, 
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In The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual Harold Cruse insists that the Black Nationalist 
movement, led by Black intellectuals, must disassociate itself completely from the white left.  
Therein lies the “crisis of the Negro intellectual”, for as long as the leaders of the Black 
movement lean on the contributions of white intellectuals, whether radical or liberal, they can 
never create “new conceptions of reality,” adding, “it was historically unfortunate that the 
American Negro created no social theorists to back up his long line of activist leaders… 
Instead the American Negro has unwittingly, been forced to share in many of the corrupted 
values of the society.”10 
Cruse places Harlem at the center of Black hopes for autonomy.  He states, “Harlem 
is the Black world’s key community for historical, political, economic, cultural and/or ethnic 
reasons … the way Harlem goes (or does not go) so goes all black America”.  White radicals 
and liberals alike (supported by many Black intellectuals from the Harlem Renaissance 
through the 60s) strove to integrate Harlem under the mantra “break up the Harlem ghetto.”11  
Yet the integration of Harlem would certainly envelop and overwhelm Black cultural identity 
with a white cultural identity backed by economic and political power. 
Cruse provides us with stinging criticism of a white radical left that was almost 
invariably pro-integrationist, aspiring to “class solidarity”.  Yet the white left was/is 
completely blind to the cultural desires of the Black community as well as the dual nature of 
its oppression.  Furthermore, the white left (no matter how radical) adheres to white 
bourgeois cultural standards even while contesting capitalist economic and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Theodore W. Allen, The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America, Vol 2 of The 
Invention of the White Race, (London: Verso, 1997). 
10 Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual,,564-65. 
11 Ibid., 12 
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hegemony.  In addition, Cruse points out the importance of mass media in subsuming the 
Black intelligentsia under white cultural dominance.12 
While Omi and Winant do not directly lay claim to either a nationalist or Marxist 
racial paradigm they certainly draw from each in the process of developing a theory of 
“racial formation”.  They claim, however, that “most racial theory fails to capture the 
centrality of race in American politics and American life,” and that “most theories are 
marked by a tendency to reduce race to a mere manifestation of other supposedly more 
fundamental social and political relationships such as ethnicity or class”.13  Their central goal 
is therefore to draw from three existing paradigms of race - ethnicity, class, and nation - to 
create a new paradigm that centers on race as a critical determinant of political reality in the 
United States.14 For Omi and Winant race is constantly changing and evolving due to 
political struggle such as the civil rights movement, the Black power movement or the white 
backlash against “preferential” hiring which resulted in the movement toward a “color-blind” 
society. Three concepts are critical to understanding racial formation.  First, they define race 
as any “concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to 
different types of human bodies”.15  Second, they define racial formation “as the 
sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and 
destroyed”.16  Finally, they define a racial project as “simultaneously an interpretation, 
representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid. 
13 Their emphasis. Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 2. 
14 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 2-13. 
15 Ibid., 55. 
16 Ibid. 
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resources along particular racial lines”.17  The racial project exists as the motor for 
transforming racial formation via competing projects such as a liberal project, conservative 
project, or radical projects on the right and left.  As these projects compete in the ideological, 
social, and political battlefields new projects are created and old projects are pushed to the 
fringes.  If a racial project becomes prevalent enough it is likely to get institutionalized and 
standardized and become a part of our everyday discourse, or what they refer to following 
Antonio Gramsci “common sense”.18 
Theodore Allen’s work seeks to uncover the origin and continued significance of 
racial oppression in the United States.  Allen first compares phenotypically-based racial 
oppression in the Anglo-American slave colonies (later states) to English non-phenotypical 
racial oppression of the Irish beginning in the 14th century.  Allen does this to show how 
racialized feelings between a subject group and an oppressed group can lead the former to 
protect its “interest” in maintaining its superior position to the latter, whether the basis for 
this superior position is real or perceived.  Despite their racialized oppression by the English, 
when Irish Catholics migrated to the United States in the 19th century they were assimilated 
into the “white race” and became defenders of Black enslavement in the United States.19 
Plantation labor in the Anglo-American colonies (Allen concentrates on Virginia) was 
based on a range of unfree labor regimes.  Landholders first attempted to enlist the American 
indigenous population as bond laborers but the latter, more familiar with the land and thus 
more easily able to escape, were unwilling to assume an inferior position in an unfamiliar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 56. 
18 Ibid., 67. 
19 Allen, Racial Oppression and Social Control, Vol. 1 of The Invention of the White Race, 
2nd ed..  And, Allen, The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America, Vol 2 of The 
Invention of the White Race. 
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hierarchical societal structure.  Labor power instead came from limited-term bond laborers 
from Europe (primarily England) and Africa.  During the 17th century, Allen claims, the legal 
status of African and European bond laborers was not sharply distinguishable. He therefore 
suggests that there was no universal concept of the “white race” at this time.  For instance, in 
1666 in Northampton County, Virginia “10.9 percent of the African-Americans and 17.6 
percent of European-Americans were landholders”.20  Nearly two centuries later in 1860, in 
the state of Virginia, the population of European-Americans owning land “was 46 percent 
less” while the population of African-Americans owning land had decreased by 95 percent, 
proportionately.21  Allen claims that the disproportional decrease in African-American land 
ownership “was the result not of normal capitalist economic development but of racial 
oppression”.22  Allen points to two main factors that led to this growing disparity.  First, after 
the completion of the bond contract, European-Americans had more access to the capital 
required to purchase land via familial and personal ties.  Second, landholders tended to 
extend bond terms (usually for attempting to escape or otherwise misbehaving), longer for 
African-Americans than European-Americans23. 
Allen then emphasizes the critical role of Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676 in impelling the 
landholding elite to develop an effective strategy for social control of bonded laborers.  Allen 
does not focus on the “great men” interpretation of the rebellion that analyzes the importance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Allen, The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America, Vol. 2, 184. 
21 Allen lists in Table 10.1 on page 185 of the same text that European-American landholders 
totaled 17.55% in 1666 (Northampton County) and 9.53% in 1860 (Virginia), while African-
American landholders totaled 10.93% in 1666 (Northampton County) and 0.54% in 1860 
(Virginia). 
22 Ibid. 
23 This is consistent with Allen’s claim that the relative social status of African-American 
laborers and European-American laborers was being “fought-out” over these years but by no 
means had come to a decisive conclusion. Ibid., 186. 
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of Nathaniel Bacon, an out-of-favor counselor, and Sir William Berkeley, the Governor of 
Virginia, or their rival opinions on the importance of driving west the indigenous peoples.  
Rather, he emphasizes the mass participation and demands of non-landowners, both 
European-American and African-American, who joined in the rebellion to fight for their own 
interests.  For Allen, the eagerness of bond-laborers to join a rebellion against the gentry 
signals a weakness in social control of the masses, while the willingness of European-
Americans and African-Americans to ally with one another for the same cause demonstrates 
the incompleteness if not non-existence of a prevalent racial bias toward African-Americans 
at the time.  The rebellion spurred an interest in developing an effective intermediate buffer 
social control stratum to prevent mass uprisings.  Beginning in 1691 laws were put into place 
that solidified the African-Americans’ place as hereditary chattel life-time bond laborers 
while European-American limited-term bond laborers were given the semblance of rights 
constituting a position in society superior to African bonded laborers.  This would lead to a 
growing white consciousness and the development of “white supremacy” as white non-land 
owners would come to act as slave patrols and thus an intermediate buffer social control 
stratum that subordinated class-consciousness to race-consciousness.  Allen identifies this 
moment as the origin of deep racial division among surplus-producing workers in the United 
States.24 
Much of the discussion about demobilization of the League has emphasized internal 
conflict: ideological strain at the intersection of Black Nationalism and Marxism 
(Geschwender), personality factionalism (Georgakas and Surkin) and lack of organizational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Allen, The Origin of Racial Oppression in Anglo-America. 
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structure (Allen).  However, the framework presented by Christian Davenport makes it 
possible to analyze the interplay of internal and external demobilizing factors.25  
Davenport identifies five internal challenges that movements might face: burnout, 
factionalization, lost commitment, membership loss, and rigidity.  Burnout refers to 
dissidents becoming tired of the stresses of being involved in a movement causing 
disengagement.  Factionalization occurs when differences in opinion arise either 
ideologically or tactically causing a schism in the group.  If suffering from lost commitment a 
social movement organization (SMO) participant loses their emotional attachment to the 
movement in question.  Membership loss refers to the mechanical functioning of an SMO 
and the amount of people it will take to accomplish the goals of the organization.  Finally, if 
a movement places too much power into the hands of only a few inflexible leaders the 
organization may not be able to react to change.  This is referred to as rigidity.26 
 Davenport also identifies three ways that SMOs are challenged from the outside:  
resource deprivation, problem depletion, and state repression. SMOs need resources to thrive 
(or survive), but these resources often come from external sources.  If these sources are cut 
off or become suddenly unsympathetic to the cause, resource deprivation is likely to occur.  
Problem depletion occurs when constituents perceive an improvement in the situation that the 
SMO is challenging.  In this situation a government (or other institution) may make reforms 
(whether real or perceived) that are perceived to be a positive change.  Finally, state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Christian Davenport, How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the 
Republic of New Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
26 Ibid., 32-37. 
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repression occurs when a government undertakes coercive action in order to harm the SMO 
and limit its effectiveness.27 
A social movement will have a greater chance of success (and survival) if it properly 
judges the potential issues, and adjusts as their realities change.  Efforts to predict and 
counter repressive acts are referred to as reappraisal, the continuous evaluation of the 
movement’s strengths and vulnerabilities.  An SMO may also attempt to build trust, comfort, 
and dedication among its members.  On the other hand, governments will often try to remain 
one step ahead of an organization.  Governments accomplish this by either overwhelming the 
SMO with superior resources or outwitting the SMO by acting in unexpected ways.28 
I have identified three sources of demobilization from Davenport’s model (one 
internal and two external) to examine more deeply with reference to the League: 
factionalization, resource deprivation, and repression.  Like Davenport, I am primarily 
concerned with the intersection of internal and external sources of demobilization.29 While 
the current research is in no way as comprehensive as Davenport’s case study on the 
Republic of New Africa, similar temporal, geographical, and ideological locations allow me 
to isolate certain important aspects of Davenport’s theoretical framework to a new but 
comparable SMO and extend repression beyond the state to private entities including unions 
and companies.30  To this end I would like to present a few questions that drove my research: 
How and why did the League mobilize? What caused it subsequently to demobilize?  Can we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., 23-32. 
28 Ibid. 
29 He has numbered each intersection in a simple 3x5 matrix numbered 1-15, but just two 
intersections concern us in the case of the League.  The intersection of factionalization and 
resource deprivation is identified as intersection 1.  The intersection of repression and 
factionalization is identified as intersection 11. Furthermore, Davenport’s matrix is a 
heuristic rather than a hypothetico-deductive tool. 
30 The RNA and the League, as you will see in Chapter 3, actually had close ties. 
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trace the chronological intersections of internal and external demobilizing factors?  Is it 
possible to judge the relative causal importance of internal and external demobilizing factors? 
Over the course of this research my views on the most important causes of the 
League’s demobilization changed more than once.  However, close historical tracing of the 
League allows me to argue that external factors (repression and resource deprivation) played 
the primary role in the demobilization of the League while internal factors would play a 
secondary, albeit important role. Since the three most detailed secondary sources on the 
League all emphasize internal causes of demobilization to the neglect of external causes, I 
needed to base this study on primary sources.  These sources make it possible to trace the 
narrative of the League chronologically in order evaluate at which points the League made 
major shifts in strategy and ideology and as a result of what external and internal forces.  
Many of these archives were located in the Walter P. Reuther Library at Wayne State 
University in Detroit.  There I consulted the Detroit Revolutionary Movement Records, 
submitted by General Baker of the League, and the Dan Georgakas Collection, submitted by 
Georgakas.  I also consulted a collection of primary sources on microfilm called Black Power 
Movement Part 4 held by Northwestern University but accessible via Inter-Library Loan.  
Other archives exist that I would have liked to consult, but time and resource limitations did 
not permit.  “Mainstream” newspapers such as The Detroit News and The Detroit Free Press 
are consulted where ever possible to avoid relying exclusively on the League’s self-
representation.  Lack of access prevented me from consulting a few pertinent articles in the 
Michigan Chronicle. 
The following chapters begin with narrative and then move to analysis.  The first 
chapter discusses the UAW’s rise in Detroit, culminating in a crucial battle at Ford’s River 
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Rouge Plant in 1941, resulted in the unionization of the auto industry’s last major holdout 
against unionization. In order to gain the support of Ford’s substantial Black workforce, the 
UAW promised to fight for racial equality.  A second part of this chapter shows that despite 
the promises of the UAW, conditions for Black workers in the auto industry remained poor 
relative to their white counterparts through the period of the League’s founding.  The second 
chapter explores the activities of the Revolutionary Union Movements and radical 
newspapers that jointly founded the League.  The third chapter traces the activities of the 
League once it was fully formed, showing its gradual movement away from plant activity.  
The fourth chapter analyzes how two external demobilization factors, repression and resource 
deprivation, affected the League.  I claim that these were the primary causes of League 
demobilization.  The fifth and final chapter concludes that the League’s ideological mixture 
of Black Nationalism and Marxism influenced the tactical and ideological factionalization, 
that constituted a secondary cause of League demobilization.  I’ll finally rap up with some 
concluding remarks.
14 
Chapter One 
Condition of Black Automobile Workers 1919-1968 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The U.S. automobile industry, particularly in Detroit, grew rapidly in size and 
importance during the early and middle portions of the twentieth century. 
Contemporaneously, Blacks migrated in large numbers to escape oppressive conditions of the 
south in search of (better) paid work in the industrialized north in what has come to be 
known as the Great Migration.  Henry Ford was one of the first industrialists to harness this 
new influx of labor and garnered a reputation as a friend to the Black worker. Yet, conditions 
for Black workers at Ford remained poor even relative to horrid conditions experienced by 
white workers.  As the UAW struggled to unionize the auto industry, it had to address the 
disparity between Ford’s reputation as a leading employer of Black labor and the persistent 
disadvantage faced by Black workers at Ford and elsewhere the auto industry.  This chapter 
is split into two main sections. The first describes the burgeoning relationship between Black 
workers and the UAW, particularly with reference to the unionization of Ford in the early 
1940s.  Black workers, politicians, and community leaders had to choose whether to continue 
to trust Ford or to switch their allegiance to a predominantly white union.  When Ford was 
unionized in 1941, UAW pledged to uphold a policy of racial egalitarianism, ushering in a 
two-and-a-half decade alliance between Black workers and the UAW.  The second section of 
this chapter will examine whether this alliance resulted in real material gains for Black 
workers and, if so, to what degree?  Whatever their absolute gains, did Black workers gain 
relative to white workers? 
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2. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF BLACK WORKERS TO THE UAW AND THE 
AUTO INDUSTRY 
In order to better understand how the League of Revolutionary Black Workers was 
founded, we must first briefly examine the complex relationship that Black workers had to 
the UAW and the auto industry throughout the early and mid-twentieth century.  Much of 
this relationship concerns workers at Ford Motor Company, the first auto company to hire 
Black workers in large numbers.  I will first look at the traits that made Ford distinct from 
other auto companies during the time period.  Then I will briefly compare Black workers 
employment at Ford with other auto companies.  Third, I will examine the complexities 
behind UAW’s progressive reputation on the question of race.  Finally, and most importantly, 
I will trace the difficult and contradictory process of unionizing Ford, the last of the major 
auto companies to unionize.  
Black workers first migrated to Detroit in significant numbers during a labor shortage 
caused by World War I.  Many manufacturers welcomed the influx, but by 1919, as a result 
of unique hiring practices, Ford was poised to become Detroit’s leading employer of Black 
labor.1 Henry Ford, along with his top executive Charles Sorensen, met with Rev. Robert L. 
Bradby, the pastor of Second Bapitist Church, Detroit’s largest Black religious institution, 
and got him to agree to recommend “very high type fellows” as well as promote the work 
standards desired by Ford.  During the course of the 1920s, Ford would create similar 
relationships with other Black religious leaders in Detroit.2  By working with local Black 
religious leaders and providing the best job opportunities available to Blacks in Detroit, Ford 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2007), 6. 
2 Ibid., 9-11. 
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was able to gain the support of the local NAACP and Urban League (this would prove to be a 
major barrier to unionization at Ford).3 Ford was not particularly progressive in his views on 
race, but rather was practicing a brand of paternalistic philanthropy epitomized by statements 
such as “dominance is an obligation. The whole solution of the race question as of every 
other lies in the stronger serving the weaker, the abler serving the less developed”.4  That is, 
he believed in the so-called “white man’s burden”.  Despite Ford’s active interest in 
preventing unionization, Herbert R. Northrup claims that “there is no evidence that Henry 
Ford Originally decided to employ large numbers of Negroes at River Rouge for other than 
altruistic reasons”.5  But, Ford was able to take advantage of his support from the Black 
community to forestall unionization longer than any of his competitors.6 
 During the late 1930s almost half of the Black auto-workers in Detroit worked for 
Ford.  Throughout the industry, Black workers were concentrated in just one or two 
production locations and placed into the most physically demanding and dangerous jobs, 
particularly in foundry operations.7  According to Lloyd H. Bailer the 1930 U.S. census 
reveals that three-fourths of the Black automobile workers compared to one-fourth of white 
automobile workers held unskilled positions, while only one-eighth of Black automobile 
workers compared to half of white automobile workers held skilled or white-collar positions. 
Bailer insists that even these numbers are misleading as:  
semiskilled and skilled Negro workers were found in such departments, where 
they were confined to the most hazardous or otherwise undesirable 
occupations… Likewise, Negro unskilled workers filled the more undesirable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid., 16-22. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 Herbert R. Northrup, “Automobiles and Aircraft,” in Organized Labor and the Negro, 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944), 190. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Geschwender, Class Race & Worker Insurgency, 20. 
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jobs in that broad occupational category.  In brief, Negroes were not only 
concentrated in occupations requiring less skill but were also attached to the 
worst jobs within each occupational classification8  
  
Soon after the 1933 passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which 
guaranteed the right to collective bargaining, the leaders of the Urban League and the 
NAACP began reconsidering their position on organized labor.9  After NIRA was deemed 
unconstitutional in 1935 congress passed the Wagner Act that not only guaranteed the right 
to collective bargaining and adopted several other provisions supporting workers rights to 
unionize.10  As auto-industry unionization began to pick up steam Black workers remained 
largely skeptical of unions as only opportunistically supporting them when necessary to win 
strikes. 
 That being said, the UAW does have a reputation of being a particularly racially 
progressive union during that time period.  During the 1930s and 1940s, CIO industrial 
unions (the UAW included) espoused egalitarian racial policies.  In 1940 the UAW appointed 
seven salaried Black recruiters to aid in the drive to unionize Ford.11  The UAW also came to 
the defense of the Black community after the Detroit race “riots” of 1943 that stemmed from 
the Black community’s demand for more housing, standing with the NAACP and the Urban 
League in support of the right for Blacks to live in the Sojourner Truth Housing Project 
located between a white working class neighborhood and a well-to-do Black neighborhood.  
When Blacks’ rights to live in the housing project were rescinded, the UAW-CIO encouraged 
trade unionists to take up picket lines at Detroit City Hall.  Both Black and white trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lloyd H. Bailer, “The Negro Automobile Worker,” Journal of Political Economy 51, no. 5 
(October 1943): 417. 
9 Meier and Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW, 20, 29-31;  
10 John Barnard, American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers During the Reuther Years, 
1935-1970, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004), 56-57. 
11 Ibid., 82. 
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unionists attended the protest, and what is more, the majority of Catholic workers 
(historically a racist stronghold) believed that the housing project should be open to Black 
workers.  The president of the UAW stated that he was “more convinced than ever that 
justice requires that the project be occupied by Negro workers who are in need of public 
housing”. 12  Yet, at times, these egalitarian policies proved opportunistic and the racism of 
the largely white rank-and-file intransigent.  As an example, when Chrysler sought to break a 
1939 strike by encouraging Black workers to return to the factories (as an effort to incite 
racial violence) many Black leaders, including members of the NAACP and prominent 
ministers, took the side of the union, leading to the success of the strike.  As Meier and 
Rudwick inform us:  
In the year following the Chrysler strike, despite all the apprehension that the 
black strikebreakers had generated at Dodge Main, and despite the help 
rendered on that occasion by black civic leaders, the UAW had done little 
about the grievances of the black workers. Discrimination on the job remained 
essentially unchanged; much was left undone on the touchy issue of black 
participation in union social functions; and only slight improvement was 
registered in the number of black holding elective and staff positions in the 
UAW”.13   
 
Despite these troubles an alliance between Black workers and leadership was on the way to 
being forged and would be solidified by one impending battle; the unionization of Ford. 
 In September of 1940 the UAW once again began to organize Ford despite previous 
difficulty.  With a strike impending, both the UAW and Ford recognized that Black workers 
were likely to sway the results of the strike.  In face of this tactical situation, the UAW hired 
seven salaried Black organizers as a part of an operation to organize Black workers. 
Originally, the committee was headed by a white man with a strong record, as president of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 175-183 
13 Ibid., 67-72 
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his local, for racial equality.  However, the Black organizers were upset and requested that a 
Black man be put in charge of the operation.  Thus, Walter Hardin was brought in to be 
director of all “Negro organizational activities at Ford”.  Hardin subsequently hired two 
Black secretaries.  With this the UAW-CIO14 formed its very first mostly Black team, used as 
an organizational tactic in order to garner support from Black workers. On the other side of 
the dispute Ford hired a significant number of Black workers to tilt the tide in their favor.  
Meier and Rudwick go as far as to claim that Ford intentionally brought in trained fighters 
such as boxers and street-fighters.  By the end of March Ford had between 14,000 and 17,000 
Black employees,15 “the largest black workforce in its history”.16  Major Black organizations 
were split, with the Urban League leaning toward Ford and the NAACP leaning toward the 
UAW.  Another major organization, the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance, openly 
endorsed Ford.  Most Black workers took no strong position, going home during the strike 
rather than remaining in the plant as strikebreakers or walking the picket lines.  The strike 
officially began on April 1, 1941, and the River Rouge plant, the plant with the largest 
proportion of Black workers, became the main point of contention.  Three hundred white 
workers and between 1,500 and 2,500 Black workers chose to remain in the plant on the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The early years of auto-worker organization were contested by many independent worker’s 
organizations touting their own ideologies and tactics. From the passage of NIRA the AFL 
took the leading role in shaping the auto-workers unions. However, disagreement over 
organizational structure, craft (horizontal) or industrial (vertical) unionization led to a 
factional split within the organization in 1935 becoming the CIO. Meanwhile, in 1936 a new 
body, the UAW, was formed and affiliated with the CIO leading to the CIO’s expulsion from 
the AFL. The UAW-CIO positioned itself to the left of the AFL (referred to in some books as 
the UAW-AFL) and as the industrial union. During the Ford strike of 1941 the UAW-AFL 
eventually aligned itself with Ford supporting a “back to work” campaign that eventually 
failed.; For more information see Barnard, American Vanguard, 36-72. 
15 Depending on the source you consult Meier and Rudwick (84) claim 14,000, while 
Geschwender (30) claims 17,000. 
16 Meier and Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW, 84. 
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day of the strike; many of them the newer workers hired intentionally as strikebreakers.  A 
couple of the strike-breakers telephoned Horace White, a progressive Detroit pasture and 
leader in the Black community, to express that they knew White was mad at them, but they 
were being promised higher wages and that they would be taken care of “union or no 
union”.17  On April 2, the second day of the strike, workers in the plant were sent to attack 
the picketers (additionally attempting to incite racial violence).   Subsequently, the UAW-
CIO appealed to leaders in the Black community and received support from the NAACP 
Detroit Youth Council headed by Horace Sheffield.  Sheffield acquired a UAW-CIO sound 
car and began appealing to Black strikebreakers on April 3. Sheffield is attributed with 
defusing racial violence as well as shifting the adult branch of the NAACP to a pro-union 
stance.  By the end of the strike’s third day, over a hundred Black leaders, including 
representatives from the Detroit NAACP, political leaders, the AKA sorority, and the Detroit 
Urban League were prepared to both endorse the UAW-CIO and condemn Ford’s use of 
strikebreakers.  They claimed in an official statement that “the Negro worker in the Ford 
plant would lose no privileges because of union membership and ‘stands to gain additional 
privileges in the way of better jobs through the union’s promotion policy based on seniority, 
regardless of race”’.18  Tensions still remained high and violence continued at the margins, 
but the UAW-CIO was gaining momentum as more and more Black leaders became 
convinced that the way forward for Black workers was within the union.  According the 
Meier and Rudwick, by Monday April 7 UAW leaders had “assured the NAACP Secretary 
that they now planned to work aggressively for the promotion of Blacks to all job categories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid, 87-88. 
18 Meier and Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW, 93. And Ford Organizing 
Committee press release, 8:54 P.M., April 3, 1941, NAACP Ford Strike File; Ford Facts, 
April 5, 1941. 
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and that they asked only for the opportunity to show that the union would do more for Blacks 
than Ford”.19  The UAW-CIO would go on to win the strike and thus a National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB)-supervised unionization vote between the Ford- backed UAW-AFL 
and the more radical UAW-CIO.  The UAW-CIO went on to win the vote and thus full 
unionization of Ford.20 
 With this labor victory (and the promises made to Black workers and their 
communities in order to make it happen), an alliance was forged between labor organizations 
and the Black communities of Detroit.  This led to, as discussed earlier, the UAW’s support 
during the race “riots” of 1943 and the housing controversies of the same time period.  The 
alliance lasted well into the 1950s and early 1960s.  Yet, by the late 1960s, lack of progress 
in the position of Black workers relative to white workers brought scrutiny from more radical 
Black workers who remained disproportionately in the most dangerous and menial positions.  
They insisted that despite its egalitarian rhetoric the UAW (in collusion with the companies) 
at worst promoted and at best remained neutral to racist hiring and promotion practices.   
 
 
3. BLACK LABOR IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY IN THE 50s AND 60s 
There is no doubt that Black workers, at the beginning of the 1950s, sat in 
quantifiably inferior position to their white counterparts.  Three primary questions are to be 
posed in this section.  Did the material condition of Black autoworkers improve, that is in 
terms of both skilled jobs and safety conditions, relative to white workers?  Did Black 
workers continue to cycle in and out of employment quicker and more often than white 
workers (thus maintaining Black workers as members of a racialized industrial reserve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Meier and Rudwick, Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW, 99 
20 Ibid., 82-107 
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army)?  Finally, did Black workers make gains at the level of UAW elected union officials at 
the local and national level? 
 In 1970, Herbert R. Northrup analyzed the post-war experience of Black workers at 
each of the big three auto producers.21  He separates his data into two eras, a “post-war 
reconversion” era highlighted by modest industry gains followed by national economic 
recession from 1958 to 1961, and an era highlighted by “industrial expansion and civil 
rights” ending in 1968. Sporadic sample sizes and regional inconsistency in Northrup’s data 
make it difficult to interpret.  This is likely due to limited research on racial makeup of 
industrial workforces during this time period. However, data becomes more readily available 
throughout the 60s as research becomes more thorough. While the data may not be 
representative, I believe that enough is available to be indicative of overall racial trends in the 
auto industry.  
 The geographic disbursement and size was different for each company having 
different effects on Black workers. In 1940, prior to U.S. direct involvement in World War II 
and full unionization, Chrysler had an estimated 50,000 hourly employees.22 Its employment 
peaked in 1955 with 176,356 employees before decreasing significantly due to financial 
troubles.23  Chrysler began to increase employment again in 1961 and reached 153,973 by 
1968.24 While comparative numbers are not provided it is clear that both Ford and General 
Motors were significantly larger as early as 1940. In 1968 GM had a total workforce of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Herbert R. Northrup, “The Negro in the Automobile Industry,” in Negro Employment in 
Basic Industry: A Study of Racial Policies in Six Industries, edited by Herbert R. Northrup, 
44-112, (Philadelphia: Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1970). 
22 Ibid., 55. 
23 Ibid., 66. 
24 Ibid.,77. 
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621,991 and Ford had a total workforce of 244,819.25  Furthermore, Chrysler was the most 
concentrated company in and around the city of Detroit, while GM was the most dispersed, 
nationally and internationally.26  This suggests that Chrysler’s Black employment should 
reflect changes in the Black population of Detroit more closely than its counterparts, while 
GM may deviate further from it.27 
As seen in Table 1.1 prior to unionization Ford hired significantly more Black 
employees than did its competitors making up 11.1 percent of its Michigan workforce, 
compared to 4.0 of Chrysler’s total workforce and 2.5 percent of GM’s workforce in 
Michigan and Indiana.28 By 1957, prior to the economic recession, Chrysler had significantly 
increased its Black employment.  For instance, across four Detroit plants surveyed the 
percentage of Black workers to total workers was 20.3 percent,29 greater than the Black 
population of Detroit, which stood at 16.8 percent in 1960 but was likely slightly less three 
years prior in 1957.30 In the same year, Ford appears to have made less progress in the hiring 
of Black workers stagnating at around 11.6 percent over a sample size of ten plants across the 
country,31 while GM sees an increase to 14.3 percent over a sample size of seven plants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 65, 70. 
27 While I do my best to concentrate the data in and around Detroit it is important to note that 
the UAW represented autoworkers industry wide regardless of region. For instance racial 
employment progress took hold much slower in the southern states despite the presence of a 
union. 
28 Northrup, “The Negro in the Automobile Industry”, 55.  
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30 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, United States Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics 
on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For 
Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States, Population Division Working 
Paper No. 76, (Washington, D.C., 2005). 
31 Northrup, “The Negro in the Automobile Industry”, 67. 
	  	  
24 
across the country.32  This seems consistent for Ford, because although Ford added Black 
employment to its other plants it significantly cut the production size of its River Rouge 
plant, Ford’s primary employer of Black workers. However, Northrup suggests that in 
actuality “General Motors’ domestic labor force of about 450,000 in the mid-1950’s, was 
approximately 8 or 9 percent negro”.33 The year after the recession hit the percentage of 
Black employees at Chrysler decreased significantly to 14.7 percent over the same four 
Detroit plants,34 while GM took a less significant hit falling to 11.2 percent over the same 
seven plant cross country sample size,35 and Ford increased slightly to 12.4 percent over the 
same ten plant cross country sample size.36  GM’s less drastic decrease in Black employment 
during this time period compared to Chrysler can be attributed to its more geographically 
diverse locations, and being less affected by the economic downturn generally.  Contrarily, 
Northrup addresses the difference between Ford and Chrysler by simply stating that at Ford 
workers had more seniority than their Chrysler counterparts.  But there is another issue at 
stake here regarding the UAW’s promise during the 1941 strike to promote the interests of 
Black workers by giving them access to better, more stable jobs. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., 69. 
33 Ibid., 68. 
34 Ibid., 66. 
35 Ibid., 67. 
36 Ibid., 69. 
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Table 1.1 Black Workers as a Percentage of Total Workers by Company37 
Year Chrysler – 
number of 
Black 
workers 
Chrysler – 
Black 
workers as 
percentage 
of total 
workers 
Ford – 
number of 
Black 
workers 
Ford – 
Black 
workers as 
percentage 
of total 
workers 
GM – 
number of 
Black 
workers 
GM – 
Black 
workers as 
percentage 
of total 
workers 
1940 2,000a 4.0a 9,882b 11.1b 100,000c 2.5c 
1957 9,242d 20.3d 3,234e 11.6e 1,563f 14.3f 
1958 3,345d 14.7d 2,582e 12.4e 1,923f 11.2f 
1968 N/A 25a N/A 25>x>12.7a N/A 12.7a 
Table 1.1 Black Workers as a Percentage of Total Workers by Company 
a: Entire workforce 
b: All Michigan plants 
c: All Michigan and Indiana automobile and auto plants 
d: Four plants in Detroit 
e: Ten plants across the country 
f: Seven plants across the country 
 Black workers did make some headway in terms of employment in the auto industry.  
Whereas in 1940 nonwhites made up only 3.7 percent of the auto workforce, in 1950 that 
number had risen to 7.8 percent, and by 1960 it reached 9.1 percent.38  By 1968, the year that 
DRUM and ELRUM (two of the most active members of the League) were founded, that 
number, among the big three auto companies, had reached 14.5 percent. That same year the 
company most closely related to Detroit and most inclined to hire Black workers relative to 
total employment employed, Chrysler, had a Black workforce making up 25 percent of the 
total workforce.   This statistic is, however, misleading in three different ways.  Firstly, while 
some of these jobs are outside of Detroit the majority of them remained in Detroit, a city with 
a rapidly growing Black population (due to the latter half of the Great Migration).  Second, 
there is no corresponding increase of Black workers in white-collar work or highly skilled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Statistics	  drawn	  from	  best	  available	  information.	  
38 Northrup, The Negro in the Automobile Industy, 74. 
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blue collar jobs.  Third, safety conditions were more neglected at the factories where Black 
workers constituted the majority. 
 While the overall share of nonwhite (primarily Black) workers may have risen by 
10.8 percentage points over the span of 28 years, the Black population of Detroit was 
growing at a much higher rate.  During the Great Migration (1915-1960), approximately five 
million southern Blacks migrated north to industrial cities.39  One of the main destinations for 
this migration was Detroit, in early years largely because of Ford’s announcement of a five-
dollar workday and his propensity to hire Black workers.  This trend continued into the 
forties, fifties, and sixties as Chrysler became another company known for hiring Black 
workers (eventually GM would follow suit, but would continue to lag behind its two main 
competitors).  Due to this factor and white flight out into the suburbs, Detroit’s Black 
population grew from 9.2 percent in 1940 to 43.7 percent in 1970.40 However, according to 
Northrup’s study over six industries (automobile, aerospace, steel, rubber tires, petroleum, 
and chemical) the automobile industry was a more likely destination for Black workers.41 
While this suggests that the UAW was making progress in terms of absolute employment 
growth it does not necessarily imply equality. 
 A second issue that still existed within the plants was a lack of upward mobility for 
Black workers. However, it still bears consideration.  In 1968, out of a total of 813,729 white 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Alferdteen Harrison, preface to Black Exodus: The Great Migration from the American 
South, Alferdteen Harrison ed., (Jackson MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), vii). 
40 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, United States Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics 
on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For 
Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States, Population Division Working 
Paper No. 76, (Washington, D.C., 2005). 
41 Herbert R. Northrup, “Concluding Analysis,” in Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A 
Study of Racial Policies in Six Industries, edited by Herbert R. Northrup, 715-43, 
(Philadelphia: Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 
1970), 721. 
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workers employed by GM, Ford, or Chrysler, 235,533 (28.94%) were “white collar.  
Contrastingly, out of 137,829 Black workers employed by GM, Ford, or Chrysler only 5,757 
(4.18%) were “white collar”.42   It is plain to see that Black workers were underrepresented as 
white-collar workers in the auto industry, important to note the UAW’s limited influence on 
hiring to white collar, non-union positions. 
 Where the UAW had more influence, in hiring to highly skilled union craft jobs, 
however, workers were, if anything, even more underrepresented. Data accumulated with the 
help of the UAW by the United States Civil Rights Commission in 1960 paints a bleak 
picture of the progress made in UAW-represented factories.  The UAW reported statistics on 
each of the “big three” auto companies on their facilities located in Detroit.  At Chrysler, for 
instance, where 26.7 percent of all employees were Black, only 24 out of 7,425 Black 
workers held skilled positions (less than 0.01%).  Similarly, General Motors reported that of 
11,125 skilled employees in the Detroit area 67 were Black.  Even Ford, with its history of 
hiring Blacks (implying seniority), reported that only 2 percent of skilled workers were 
Black, compared to 38 percent of the overall workforce.43  Although the situation had 
improved by 1968, the numbers still told a grim story of a union failing to make good on its 
commitment to racial equality.  In that year only 3.3 percent of the Blacks employed by the 
big three automobile producers were craftsmen, the second largest sector of employment in 
the automobile industry (behind operatives), and also the best paying of all blue-collar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Calculated out of Northrup, The Negro in the Automobile Industry, Table 11 Big Three 
Automobile Companies Employment by Race, Sex, and Occupational Group, 1968, 80; The 
table neglects to include a separate amount of workers of Asian, Arab, or Hispanic descent 
but as these numbers would be nominal the general point that Black workers are under 
represented in white collar work goes unaffected. 
43 United States Civil Rights Commission, Hearings Before the United States Commission on 
Civil Rights, Detroit, Michigan, December 14-15, 1960 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1961), 62-65. 
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positions.  Craftsmen were mainly hired via union apprenticeship programs, yet Northrup 
informs us that “historically, most Negroes have come to regard all apprenticeship programs 
as closed to them. … There is little reason to believe that this feeling has been substantially 
overcome in the automobile industry.”44  Even within the craft trades, Black workers were 
mostly relegated to the lower-paying less-skilled professions.  Northrup explains that since 
craftsmen are selected using scores from aptitude tests and Black workers generally score on 
the “low side…[t]hey find  opening[s] in apprentice classes for millwrights, pipe fitters, and 
welders.  The tool and die and electrical trades take those with the highest scores, and few 
Negroes now make up these groups or qualify for them.”45  The lack of progress made in the 
skilled trades under the watch of the UAW constitutes a damning critique of UAW racial 
policies when contrasted to the egalitarian claims of the international leadership.  
 The UAW under Walter Reuther had become engaged in a cooperative (rather than 
combative) negotiating process with the companies.  Between the years 1948 and 1950 
Reuther and the UAW engaged in a series of negotiations that secured certain concessions 
such as cost of living pay adjustments, pensions, and medical benefits in exchange for longer 
contracts with a no-strike clause.  Fortune Magazine touted this contract as “the treaty of 
Detroit” but the UAW gave up significant control of the shop floor.46 Ernie Allen suggests 
that this focus on pay increases rather than safety negatively affected conditions in plants, 
particularly hurting Black workers.47  Automation, new machinery brought into the plant to 
increase productivity, did not replace human labor, but often forced workers to labor harder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Northrup, “The Negro in the Automobile Industry”, 81. 
45 Ibid., 82. 
46 Barnard, American Vanguard, 270-81. 
47 Ernie Allen, “Dying From the Inside: The Decline of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers, in They Should Have Served that Cup of Coffee: Seven Radical Remember the ‘60s, 
71-109 edited by Dick Cluster, (Boston: South End Press 1979), 72. 
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and faster under increasingly unsafe conditions.  Black workers who bore the brunt of this 
abuse came to call the process “niggermation”.  
Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin describe this process at the Eldon Avenue Gear 
and Axle plant where Black workers made up 70 percent of a work force of over 4,000 and 
“considered this key plant the most niggermated factory in Detroit”.48  I would like to 
examine four telling events at this plant.  The first is of a janitor named Rose Logan.  In mid-
1969 Rose was struck by an “improperly loaded jitney whose driver’s vision was blocked”.  
Her doctor advised her to stay off her feet, but Chrysler’s doctor declared that she was ready 
to return to work. In fear for her job, Rose returned to the shop floor where she developed 
thrombophlebitis (an inflamed wall of a vein), leading ultimately to her death.49 
Just a year later, three events occurred within close succession at this plant.  First, 
another Black female employee’s life was claimed due overwork and unsafe.  On May 13, 
1970 Mamie Williams, an employee with 26 years of experience, passed out while working 
on the line and died shortly there after at her home.  The risks of working were not unknown 
to either Chrysler or Mamie Williams because a week earlier Williams had been ordered by 
her doctors to remain home and avoid strenuous labor due to a dangerous blood-pressure 
condition.  However, Chrysler, by threatening her accumulated benefits as well as her job, 
had been able to coerce Williams back to work under unsafe conditions.50 
Not even two weeks after Mamie Williams’ death, 22-year-old Gary Thompson was 
killed when his jitney malfunctioned and turned over, burying him under five tons of steel.  
An investigation of the equipment and of safety practices done by the UAW subsequent to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, A Study in Urban 
Revolution, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 86. 
49 Ibid. 87. 
50 Ibid. 
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the “accident” sheds light on management’s lack of concern for the safety of Eldon Avenue 
workers.  UAW Safety Director Lloyd Utter found that not only was the specific piece of 
equipment faulty - missing its emergency brake and having a poor transmission, along with 
further damage - many others were in similar or worse condition.  He found maintenance 
procedures to be systematically negligent: 
there is supposed to be a regularly scheduled maintenance procedure for this 
equipment in this plant.  I was also informed that operators are instructed to 
take trucks to the garage and tag them when they are in need of repairs.  
However, it seems to be the practice of foremen, when equipment is needed, 
to pull the tags off the equipment in the repair area that badly need corrective 
maintenance and put them back into service on the floor.51 
   
Such negligence shows a lack of value for life, in this case Black life. 
However, the case that received most attention was that of James Johnson, a young, 
autoworker who walked into the Eldon Avenue plant on July 15, 1970 with an M-1 carbine 
hidden in his work clothes.  Earlier that day he had been disciplined and suspended for 
refusing to participate in a work speed-up.  Johnson had also been subject to unfair loss of 
pay and vacation time in the recent past.  After spotting a foreman who had been involved in 
his suspension he began firing, killing one Black foreman, one white foreman, and a white 
job setter.  After he was taken into custody, Ken Cockrel (a member of the LRBW executive 
committee) took on his case exclaiming, “We’ll have to put Chrysler on trial for damages to 
this man caused by his working conditions”.52  The judge and jury were taken to the Eldon 
Avenue plant to witness the working conditions that could drive a person to such an act.  The 
jury felt that Johnson was not at fault as the conditions were “abominable” and acquitted 
Johnson, although eventually he would be subjected to indefinite hospitalization on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Emphasis added by author; Ibid., 86-87 
52 Ibid., 86. 
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grounds of mental disability.  Furthermore, Johnson would win a worker’s compensation suit 
against Chrysler for damages suffered during his time at the Eldon Avenue plant.53  
The awful conditions at the Eldon Avenue plant, one of the few predominantly Black 
auto plants in the country, persisting well into the 1970s, are a testament to the life-
threatening conditions Black workers faced, going beyond class exploitation into the realm of 
racially specific oppression.  This, of course, is not to claim that white workers labored in 
plants devoid of safety concerns, but to show that where Black workers were concentrated, 
both the UAW and the company neglected safety to a greater degree.  The instances 
discussed, while anecdotal, indicate that the lives and safety of Black workers were more 
systematically undervalued than those of white workers. 
Into the 1960s, the UAW Executive Board remained all white. During the course of 
the forties and fifties it was suggested many times that an executive position be created for 
the purpose of electing a Black committee member.  However, Walter Reuther insisted that 
this course of action would discriminate on the basis of “reverse Jim Crow” stating more 
starkly that, “there will come a time when a Negro will be qualified… and at such a time a 
Negro will be placed on the board”.54  This seems to suggest that Reuther did not believe that 
there was a single Black union member qualified to represent the interest of Black workers 
and workers as a whole at the highest level, but it is equally likely Reuther had an interest in 
placating a still largely racist white rank-and-file.  Only the intervention of a progressive 
Black caucus called the Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC) led to placement of a 
Black worker on the executive board.  The TULC came onto the scene in 1957, led primarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 9-11, 86; Chapter three will dicuss the Johnson case in more detail. 
54 Cornelius C. Thomas, “The Trade Union Leadership Council: Black Workers Respond to 
the United Automobile Workers, 1957-1967”, New Politics 10, no. 2 (Winter 2005), 127. 
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by Horace Sheffield and Robert “Buddy” Battle III, both experienced unionists who came of 
age during the Ford River Rouge strike of 1941.  They knew about the promises made to 
Black workers for their support and were determined to see them realized.  The UAW, on the 
other hand, did not welcome of internal challengers, especially those determined to tarnish its 
reputation for racial egalitarianism.  In 1959 TULC went head to head with the union by 
sponsoring its own Black candidate at Local 600, the local associated with the Ford River 
Rouge plant, but lost.  Later that year in October Sheffield threatened to lobby against the 
paying of dues by Black UAW members unless the union placed Willoughby Abner of 
Chicago or another Black union member on the International Executive Board. Abner, as 
anticipated, declined the nomination.  After a bitter struggle which included an attempt to fire 
Sheffield, the UAW created three at-large executive positions in 1962, one intended for a 
Black unionist.  TULC nominated Horace Sheffield as their candidate, but the Reuther camp 
maneuvered successfully to elect their candidate, the more moderate Nelson Jack Edwards.55 
This seems to be representative of the UAW’s strategy: avoid incorporating Black 
leadership as long as possible and, when one’s hand is forced, make certain that a palatable 
Black moderate can be found to fill the void.  Certainly by the late 1960s some progress had 
been made in terms of overall numbers of Black leaders within the international but at the 
local level primarily white-majority locals rarely elected Black candidates to office.  On the 
other hand, in Black-majority Local 3 and Local 961 white unionists still held majority 
power.  As we will see, when the League threatened to develop militant Black leadership, the 
union (both local and international) intervened forcefully to curtail the challenge. 
*** 
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This chapter shows how the UAW’s broken promises and the persisting material 
disadvantages faced by Black autoworkers set the stage Black worker militancy in the late 
1960s, highlighted by revolutionary union movements that coalesced into the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers. Ample evidence to suggests that Black workers remained 
faithful to the union cause for a period of over twenty years, even as the Black worker-UAW 
alliance brought them only minimal gains.  By the end of the 1960s Black workers still had 
less job security, their employment gains did not keep pace with Black population growth in 
Detroit, they were still largely shut out of skilled blue-collar and white collar jobs, faced 
worse safety conditions, and had minimal Black union representation.  In came a group of 
uncompromising, young Black radicals determined to push for real material change.  
34 
Chapter Two 
Revolutionary Union Movements and Radical Newspapers 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I hope to trace how various threads of Detroit’s radical Black political 
movement came together in the late 1960s to form the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers.  Two major components of the eventual League are discussed in this chapter: the 
Revolutionary Union Movements - first DRUM then ELRUM followed by an array of others 
– and various revolutionary newspapers, espousing a unique ideology that which they 
referred to as “Black Marxism-Leninism”. The RUMs were militant Black worker 
organizations that functioned outside of the confines of UAW bureaucracy in order to combat 
racism and labor exploitation within both the UAW and the companies.  They asserted that 
not only had the UAW failed to live up to its racially egalitarian promises of the 1940s, but 
had sold out all workers by closely allying itself with the auto corporations it was supposed 
to be fighting against.  Another group of young Black radicals produced, and distributed 
revolutionary newspapers in working-class Black neighborhoods.  I discuss events 
chronologically in order to show the simultaneous development of the various components 
and strategies. 
 
2. BEFORE THE RUMs 
The founders of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers worked for years prior 
to its founding in a compact Black radical Detroit milieu. Five leading members (four of 
whom would go on to be on the Executive Committee) - Luke Tripp, John Williams, John 
Watson, General Baker, and Gwendolyn Kemp – met as early as a 1963 NAACP-sponsored 
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protest against Detroit’s bid to host the 1968 Olympic games.1  They were all arrested and 
accused of disorderly conduct for allegedly jeering during the national anthem.  Two-and-a-
half years later they were acquitted on the grounds that there was doubt that “the five accused 
were among the actual troublemakers”.2  The League’s leaders and members did not arise 
spontaneously from the shopfloor, but rather from Detroit’s lively Black radical political 
environment. 
 Another important event that preceded and affected the trajectory of the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers was the Great Rebellion of July 1967.  This, the largest 
rebellion anywhere in the United States in over two decades, caused a spurt in radical Black 
politics as well as a conservative white backlash.  On July 23, 1967 Detroit police officers 
raided a bar primarily patronized by Black Detroiters.  Police frequently raided “blind pigs”, 
bars which lacked proper licensing and served during illegal hours, but usual practice was to 
arrest only the owners of the bar while documenting and releasing patrons. However, during 
this raid the police arrested all 82 people in the bar.  In the next few hours a growing crowd 
gathered around the bar as nearby residents were uneasy about the police presence in their 
neighborhood on a Sunday morning.  As the crowd grew, so did the police’s use of force.  
From this point, violence escalated quickly on both sides.  The governor of Michigan, 
George Romney, and the mayor of Detroit, Jerome Cavanagh ordered 9,200 National 
Guardsmen and 800 State Police officers to block off a one mile radius around the center of 
the rebellion and quell the mobilization.  Politicized members of the Black community drove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James A. Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary 
Black Workers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 87. This protest which 
arose out of the Detroit government prioritizing frivolous sporting events over the needs of 
the impoverished is similar to the protests in Brazil leading up to the 2014 World Cup. 
2 “Olympics Protesters Acquitted”, Detroit News, February 24, 1966.  
	  	  
36 
around repeating over a sound system, “This is Black power. Fight for your rights!”  Early in 
the morning of the 24th Romney and Cavanagh agreed to bring in federal help, and President 
Johnson sent in 4,700 paratroopers.  Striking levels of police brutality were reported during 
the rebellion as thirty-three Black and ten white Detroiters lost their lives.3  Furthermore, 
7,231 men and women were arrested while extensive damage was done to buildings and 
other property.4 
 The 1967 Detroit rebellion is conventionally termed a riot, implicitly denying it any 
political importance, while term rebellion calls attention to the uprising’s political 
implications.  Certainly the call for Black power and rights during the rebellion was a 
political act, but given the political environment of 1967 (Malcolm X’s assassination was just 
two years before and MLK’s assassination was yet to occur), it would not be implausible to 
suggest that most of the rebellion participants were consciously participating in an attack on 
an oppressive and exploitative system.  Many Blacks, at the time and later, including the 
League of Revolutionary Black Workers, referred to these events as a rebellion.  This level of 
political consciousness was demonstrated best when, at Cavanaugh and Romney’s request, a 
Black Congressman, Charles Diggs, showed up on the scene hoping to calm the situation. 
“He was told, ‘Go home Diggs…. [W]e want Stokely Charmichael.’”5 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern City, 
(Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001), 46-47. 
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3. REVOLUTIONARY NEWSPAPERS 
Over the course of its existence the League of Revolutionary Black Workers 
employed multiple forms of autonomous media to disseminate its message, including a local 
newspaper, a university paper, and many smaller plant specific newsletters.  John Watson of 
the League’s executive committee spearheaded and edited three League publications.  The 
first and most ambitious of these publications was called the Inner City Voice, a locally 
distributed (in Detroit) monthly paper targeted at Black working class communities.  The first 
issue was released in October of 1967, just three months after the Great Rebellion.  The paper 
was revolutionary in tone and featured provocative articles with titles such as “Michigan 
Slavery”, “Detroit’s Concentration Camps Waiting for Blacks”, and “Black Workers 
Uprising”.6  Two other (future) members of the League’s executive committee played a 
significant role in the paper’s production.  The first is General Baker, a radicalized 
autoworker from Chrysler’s Dodge Main plant.  Baker was often the League’s most 
consistent advocate of engaging in Black struggle as working class struggle. Mike Hamlin, 
the third important member of the Inner City Voice editorial team, remarked in his memoir, 
“It was General who would become our link to inside organizing in the plant.”  Hamlin also 
commented on his own role as a mediator stating that he “held it all together with all the 
personalities and egos”.7  The newspaper found a fairly strong readership, printing 10,000 
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copies of each issue and selling nearly all of them, but it struggled financially and within a 
year (and prior to the official founding of the League) it collapsed.8 
 Two other publications succeeded the Inner City Voice.  During periods of scant 
funding, particularly at the founding of the League in March 1969, a much shorter newsletter 
called Spear served as its main propaganda organ.  Although more a newsletter than a 
newspaper, Spear offered poignant critiques of the racist capitalist system in the United 
States in an accessible format.  It could also easily and inconspicuously be distributed at auto 
plants. 
 Perhaps the most interesting publication, from a political perspective, was The South 
End, the university newspaper at Wayne State University.  John Watson, a part-time student 
at Wayne State, gained editorship of the paper (and thus full access to the paper’s funding) 
for the 1968-69 school year.  He used this newfound authority to turn the school paper from 
what was previously a counter-cultural outlet to a full-on revolutionary channel.  In his first 
issue as editor, Watson outlined the paper’s goals: 
The South End returns to Wayne State with the intention of promoting the 
interests of the impoverished, oppressed, exploited, and powerless victims of 
white, racist monopoly capitalism and imperialism.  We will present that 
portion of the news which rarely received coverage in the major daily 
newspapers, or for that matter in the average university newspaper… In other 
words, we will take the hard line9… [O]ur only enemies will be those who 
would further impoverish the poor, oppress the oppressed, exploit the 
exploited and take advantage of the powerless.  We are sure there are no more 
than a handful of these rascals on campus.10 
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Watson would turn out to be overly optimistic, as he would face opposition from students, 
faculty, and even the university president.  The Detroit News even ran an article not-so-
implicitly supporting Jean Campau, an opposition candidate for student editor, toward the 
end of the 1968-69 school year.11 
In addition to League-wide information organs, many of the associated RUMs had 
their own newsletters. Some of these include the DRUM newsletter, the ELRUM newsletter, 
a FRUM (Ford Revolutionary Union Movement) newsletter, a JARUM (Jefferson Assembly 
Revolutionary Union Movement) newsletter, a FORUM (Forge Revolutionary Union 
Movement newsletter, and a newsletter representing the Blue Cross/Blue Shield RUM called 
“The Blues”.  Many of these newspapers or newsletters serve as essential primary sources for 
my analysis. 
 
4. EARLY REVOLUTIONARY UNION MOVEMENT ACTIVITIES 
 The event that really kicked off in-plant organizing and the establishment of the 
Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement was an interracial wildcat strike that began on May 
2, 1968.  This would be the last of a string of five wildcat strikes to occur in under a year at 
Chrysler’s Dodge Main plant dating back to July 1967, caused by a speedup of the Dart and 
Valiant production lines from 49 to 56 units an hour within a week.  Roughly equal numbers 
of Black and white workers walked the picket lines, yet after the three-day strike punishment 
was disproportionately meted out to Black workers.  The Inner City Voice reported in June 
that “three of the five workers discharged were Black, nine of the ten given 30 days 
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(suspension) were Black and so forth”.12  A more recent essay by James Geschwender and 
Judson Jeffries reports (based on reporting in the Michigan Chronicle) that “[s]even persons 
(five Blacks and two whites) were fired, and all but two, General G. Baker Jr. and Bennie 
Tate-both Black- were eventually rehired.”13  
 This wildcat ultimately led to the establishment of DRUM when nine production 
workers from Dodge Main, including Chuck Wooten and General Baker, met with the editors 
of Inner City Voice at a bar near the plant.  They decided that something had to be done to 
curtail the blatant racism found in the factories.  General Baker produced an open letter to 
Chrysler that was published in the Voice’s June issue.  In addition to rejecting the “banner” 
of leadership bestowed upon him by the firing, he politicized the issue by declaring, “In 
discharging me you have attempted to belittle the racial overtones in the affair which will 
prove an impossible task on your behalf.  Any confrontation between Black and white men in 
this racist decadent society is a racial and therefore political question”.  He essentially 
declared war on Chrysler, continuing, “You have made the decision to do battle with the 
entire Black community in this city, this state, this country and in this world of which I am 
part”.14  After the establishment of DRUM, the first task was to get out the word to Black 
workers around the plant.  For this, the DRUM newsletter was established and in the first 
issue of the first volume they explained why it was necessary:   
[T]he overall administration of punishment was overwhelmingly applied to 
the Black workers who were held responsible for the walk-out which was 	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directly caused by company indifference towards working conditions… We 
feel the actions taken against these workers were unjust and should not be 
tolerated.  We need your unfaultering support. Concern yourselves with the 
plight of the Black struggle.  You have but one life, live it with dignity.15 
 
 Gradually, DRUM began to gain recognition in the plant, and in June of 1968 they 
decided to test their influence (in preparation for bigger plans ahead).  Two bars near the 
plant, Bucciero’s and Mickey’s, were regularly patronized by Black workers, yet both 
institutions refused to hire Blacks with the excuse that “no black people will work for [their] 
wages,” ignoring the fact that both bars paid union rates.  DRUM went on to claim that 
Blacks were not permitted to sit in the booths and were often treated with disrespect.  To 
resolve this, the eighth issue of DRUM’s newsletter called for a “FOUR DAY BOYCOTT of 
these bars until these acts of discrimination are ended”.16  In the next issue, DRUM reported 
that there was 90 percent participation and victory was claimed.  Furthermore, “a committee 
of Black workers is now negotiating with these bars” in order to stop the racism.   
The practical success of these negotiations is unclear17, but DRUM felt that the high level of 
participation was an indication that they had enough support among Black workers in the 
plant to move forward with their program.18 
 In preparation for this program DRUM used the ninth issue of its newsletter to list 14 
demands, the means it intends to use to get them, and a date (July 19, 1968) by which the 
tactics were to be implemented.  These demands were:  
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1. D.R.U.M. demands 50 black foremen 
2. D.R.U.M. demands 10 black general foremen immediately 
3. D.R.U.M. demands 3 black superintendents 
4. D.R.U.M. demands a black plant manager 
5. D.R.U.M. demands that the majority of the employment office be black 
6. D.R.U.M. demands all black doctors and 50% black nurses in the medical 
centers at this plant 
7. D.R.U.M. demands that the medical policy at this plant be changed 
entirely 
8. D.R.U.M demands that 50% of all plant protection guards be black and 
that every time a black worker is removed from the plant premises that he 
be lead by a black brother. 
9. D.R.U.M. demands that all black workers immediately stop paying union 
dues. 
10. D.R.U.M demands that the two hours pay that goes into union dues be 
levied to the black community to aid in self determination for black 
people. 
11. D.R.U.M. demands that the double standard be eliminated and that a 
committee of the black rank and file be set up to investigate all grievances 
against the corp., to find out what type of discipline is to be taken against 
corporation, and also to find out what type of discipline is to be taken 
against Chrysler Corp. employees. 
12. D.R.U.M demands that all black workers who have been fired on trumped 
up racist charges be brought back with all lost pay. 
13. D.R.U.M. demands that our fellow black brothers in South Africa working 
for Chrysler Corp. and its subsidiaries be payed at an equal scale as white 
racist co-workers. 
14. D.R.U.M. also demands that a black brother be appointed as head of the 
board of directors Chrysler Corp. 
 The power base for these demands will be as follows: 
1. Legal demonstration at Local 3 and Solidarity house. 
2. Legal demonstration at Highland Park (Chrysler Corp. headquarters). 
3. Legal shut down of Hamtramck assembly.19 
 
Notable here is the attack on Chrysler complemented by the not-so-implicit allegation that 
the UAW has not earned Black workers’ dues and therefore should no longer receive them.  
DRUM’s militant intent was made clear as they promised to not stand idly by and wait for 
the benevolence of the company and union to fight for justice and racial equality in the auto-
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industry. They intended to mount a class and racially conscious attack in order to gain 
justice. 
 DRUM was true to its word.  Just three weeks later on Thursday, July 7, 1968 they 
held a rally in a parking lot across the street from the plant with over 300 in attendance.  
Several neighborhood groups from around Detroit were in attendance and a conga group 
provided protest music.  Luke Tripp ran down how the rally played out in an article ran in 
The South End on January 23, 1969.  After a few speeches were given the crowd seemed 
motivated to take their energy to the UAW.  Not by coincidence Local 3’s executive board  
was meeting that day.  The workers linked arms and marched to the union hall where they 
found a hostile reception.  Tripp contrasts, “the workers in their ‘humping’ blue coverall, and 
their union ‘representatives’ laid to the bone in their mohair suits.”20  The executive board 
meeting was cancelled and a general meeting was scheduled in the auditorium where DRUM 
leaders laid out their demands, and claimed that the union was in bed with the company and 
consistently failed to address workers’ grievances.  Not unexpectedly, the Local 3’s president 
Ed Liska and vice president (Charles Brooks, a Black man DRUM would denounce as an 
“Uncle Tom”) defended their actions and claimed that Chrysler maintained a lot of power.  
Workers saw that this was going nowhere and left with plans to begin a strike the next day.21 
 At 5 A.M. the next morning members of DRUM gathered at the gates of the plant in 
order to be ready for the arrival of first shift at 6 A.M.  Only Black workers (who made up 
approximately 60-70 percent of the plant) were interfered with, and they were given a 
political rundown as to the importance of the strike.  White workers, once they realized that 	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they would not be approached either continued into the factory, went home, or remained on 
the picket lines if they were sympathetic to the cause.  Over 70 percent of the Black 
workforce stayed out of the plant, building a picket line of over 3,000 workers for the 
wildcat.  Before noon six DRUM representatives visited Local 3 headquarters to once again 
discuss their demands with Ed Liska and others.  As reported later by Luke Tripp, “[t]hey 
pointed out that there were over 3,000 angry Black workers standing outside the gate because 
they were resolutely opposed to the racist policy of Chrysler and the oppressive conditions in 
the plant”.   Later in the afternoon the Hamtramck Police arrived to the picket lines equipped 
with gas masks and riot gear, and at this point DRUM opted to disperse the picketers rather 
than confront the police.  Still, about 250 of the more radical and conscious workers were 
mobilized via carpool to take the protest five miles away to Chrysler’s headquarters in 
Highland Park.  This, of course, was unwelcome to the corporate executives and it wasn’t 
long before the Highland Park police showed up, also wielding riot gear, to demand that the 
workers disperse.  A few DRUM leaders managed to slip through the police lines to demand 
to speak to “policy makers” and were unsurprisingly turned away.  Finally, the demonstrators 
decided to head back rather than directly confront the police officers.  Georgakas and Surkin 
suggest that DRUM was “[s]atisfied with having shaken company and union and having 
caused the mobilization of two departments of police.”22  The shutdown continued through 
Friday and Saturday and a meeting was set up for Sunday where twelve leaders of DRUM 
would meet with the UAW’s citywide Black caucus.  It quickly became clear that the 
younger, more radical DRUM members were tired of being told to “be patient” and work 
within the confines of the union as the more conservative Black caucus suggested.  Still, the 
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caucus agreed to support DRUM’s fight against racism at Chrysler.  On Monday picket lines 
reassembled until the Hamtramck police again intervened this time handing them John Doe 
injunctions which the workers ripped up and threw to the ground before leaving.  Full work 
would resume on Tuesday.23  The Detroit Free Press would report that Chrysler lost the 
production of 1,900 cars as a result of the July wildcat.24  Surprisingly, there do not appear to 
have been any suspensions or firings as a result of the wildcat. 
 Not every powerful institution was against DRUM though.  In August of 1968 the 
influential Interdenominational Ministers Alliance (IMA), a group of prominent Black 
ministers, threw their weight behind DRUM, stating, “Regarding their concerns about the 
medical practices of Dodge Main, we strongly urge that a thorough study of the medical 
policy of the plant be made jointly by Chrysler Corp., the UAW and representatives of 
DRUM.”25 They also stated that they “will support them in their goals” demanding “a full 
investigation of the grievance procedure at the plant”.26 
 A month later, in September, DRUM was presented with another opportunity to test 
its strength, this time through a union election.  A Local 3 trustee had died and a special 
election scheduled to select his replacement. DRUM leadership was uncertain whether to run 
a candidate but ultimately decided to proceed on several grounds: first, it could serve as a 
medium for gaining DRUM exposure and acceptance; second, win or lose, the campaign 
could “serve as a demonstration of Black solidarity and strength;” third, political activity 
serves to raise consciousness; and finally, the campaign could “contribute to DRUM’s 
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membership drive”.27 DRUM addressed the issue publicly for the first time in the 13th issue 
of their newsletter where they emphasized the vital importance of the election and laid out a 
necessary platform for any candidate.  The platform was focused around revolutionary 
change to UAW structures as well as union accountability to the rank and file, specifically 
the Black majority at Local 3.28  The 14th issue of DRUM announced support for Ron March 
who, while neither a Marxist nor a Black Nationalist, understood the harsh conditions within 
the plant, particularly as they applied to Black workers.29  DRUM campaigned for March by 
showing that Local 3 (the second largest local in the country) was broke due to 
embezzlement and misuse of funds by its current leadership.  DRUM was joined in its 
support for Ron March by the CRU (Committee for a Real Union), a radical organization 
made up of young white workers that stated, “To help break up this crony system, to get 
ourselves a real union, CRU urges everyone, white and black, to vote for RON MARCH #10 
for TRUSTEE.”30  A quick yet fierce campaign ensued, but not without interference.  
Ramparts Magazine would report that DRUM’s candidate was prohibited from putting up 
campaign signs, and that while “[s]ome candidates had helpers,” who “used ‘no standing’ 
zones in which to drop off voters; only cars with DRUM posters got tickets, and the cops 
took as long as a half hour to write them - thus tying up a car that might have brought another 
DRUM vote”.31  Nevertheless, in a field of 27 candidates, Ron March came first with 563 
votes, while his closest competitor, Joe Elliot, received 521. As election results filtered in, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 103-04 
28 Newsletter, DRUM Vol. 1 No. 13, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, Northwestern University 
Library. 
29 Newsletter, DRUM Vol. 1 No. 14, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, Northwestern University 
Library. 
30 Flyer, Committee for a Real Union, n.d., Bx 1 FD 8, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, 
Wayne State University. 
31 “The Dodge Rebellion”, Ramparts Magazine, November 30, 1968, 12. 
	  	  
47 
Hamtramck police infiltrated a bar where Black workers were gathered, harassing them 
verbally.  This led to a confrontation and eventually a meeting attended by 50 Black workers, 
including March, a slew of police and the Mayor and Chief of Police in Hamtramck.  At the 
meeting again, the workers were attacked.32 
 Although March gained a plurality in this election, rules required a runoff as no 
candidate had gained an absolute majority.  Although March was not expected garner many 
more votes in the runoff (as the votes from most other candidates were thought to most likely 
shift to Joe Elliot), Local 3 did not sit idly by.  The demographics of Local 3 had changed 
immensely over the past three decades, so while in the sixties the majority of workers were 
Black, most retirees were Polish-Americans.  Retired workers were permitted to vote in 
Local 3 elections, but few did so regularly.  In order to insure victory, Local 3 leadership sent 
a letter to its retired workers imploring them to vote in this election, claiming that a Ron 
March victory could threaten their retirement benefits. March gained a significant number of 
votes in the runoff, but still lost, 2,091 votes to 1,386.33  The 15th issue of the DRUM 
newsletter charged: 
What did the conspirators do in the election?  The white reactionary forces 
issued 15 traffic tickets to Ron March supporters cars.  They tore and rapped 
down Ron March posters.  They launched vicious attacks with axe handles on 
our black brothers peacefully assembled in the parking lot off Joe Campau and 
Clay.  They rampaged the Union Hall spraying Mace in the eyes of our black 
brothers and beat them with axe handles.  They solicited the aid of the 
notorious Michigan Chronicle to write a headline story to frighten the black 
workers at Hamtramck assembly plant… and then they finally stole the 
election from black workers…  Therefore D.R.U.M. declares that Ron March 
duely and honestly won in the election for trustee.34 	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DRUM would continue to demand improvements from the company and the union 
and held another mass rally at Chrysler’s Highland Park headquarters on October 24, 1968.  
By this time resources were running low, so DRUM organized a fundraiser/raffle set for 
November 17, 1968.35 An event flyer listed five topics to be covered by speakers: 1)History 
of the Black worker 2)Role of the Black worker 3)History of D.R.U.M/ “Its principles & 
programs” 4)Organizing the Black worker (city-wide) 5)Combat liberalism in the U.A.W.  
Three prizes were listed for the raffle, first prize being a “new M-1 Rifle”, second prize a 
“new shot gun”, and third prize a “bag of groceries”.36 
 Meanwhile, a new RUM, the Eldon Revolutionary Union Movement (ELRUM) was 
formed at the Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle Plant.  The leaders of ELRUM were associated 
with DRUM leadership and emulated the DRUM tactics and organization.  The Eldon 
Avenue plant held special importance because it was Chrysler’s only gear and axle plant, 
which meant that a strike at this plant could stall all Chrysler production.  Eldon Avenue, like 
Dodge Main, was a majority Black; ELRUM quickly gained a membership base that larger 
than DRUM’s.  In the 4th issue of its newsletter, ELRUM described the demographic makeup 
of employees at Eldon.  Of about 5,000 hourly employees at Eldon, 3,500 were Black yet, 
only 47 were employed at a level higher than “common production slave”.  Perhaps even 
more astonishingly, there were only six Black workers were employed in the skilled trades, 
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compared to nearly 500 whites.37  On November 5, 1968 ELRUM’s organizing committee 
distributed a one-page leaflet announcing a meeting to be held on Sunday, November 10.  On 
that day ELRUM was officially founded.  It wouldn’t take long for ELRUM to begin 
pressing for changes at the Eldon Avenue plant.38 
 On January 22, 1969, a Wednesday, Black Eldon workers gathered at the union hall 
of Local 961 in order to stage a protest against mistreatment by the union.  About 300 
workers were in attendance, many of whom missed the beginning of their shift.  Headed by 
ELRUM the workers presented Local 963 President Rickard with nineteen demands, 
including removal of a racist second shift nurse reinstatement of wrongfully terminated 
workers, hiring and upgrading of Black employees particularly in skilled positions, and 
safety.  The nineteenth demand reads in all caps, “AND MOST IMPORTANT, A 
COMMITTEE TO BE FORMED TO REVIEW THE APPLICATIONS OF SKILLED 
WORKERS.  THE COMMITTEE IS TO BE COMPOSED OF BLACK WORKERS, NOT 
UNCLE TOMS!”39  Rickard conceded to none of the demands and Chrysler fired two 
workers while disciplining many more.  This led ELRUM to conclude what they already 
knew, that the fight had to be waged not only against the corporation, but against the union as 
well.40 
 Recognizing the two-pronged assault, ELRUM staged a wildcat strike the following 
Monday, January 27.  Just as at the DRUM strike, white workers were not targeted by 	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picketers; only Black workers were approached and spoken with about the importance of 
fighting against racism in the UAW and the company.  It appears that there were mixed 
reactions among the workers as some continued to report to work while “a significant 
number of workers did not go in,” completely halting production.  ELRUM would claim 
success on two grounds “1) it showed Black Workers that they do have power. 2) it showed 
Black Workers who the real oppressor is- UAW.”41  Chrysler struck back, firing 26 workers 
including Fred Holsey, president of ELRUM.42  However, ELRUM insisted that, for long-
term strategic purposes, Black workers shouldn’t yield to growing retaliation from Chrysler 
and lack of support or worse from the UAW.  ELRUM, along with DRUM and an array of 
fledgling RUMs including FRUM (Ford Revolutionary Union Movement), HARUM (Health 
Workers Revolutionary Union Movement), MARUM (Mack Avenue Plant Revolutionary 
Union Movement), and UPRUM (United Parcel Service Revolutionary Union Movement), 
planned a protest for February 10, 1969 at union headquarters, the UAW International Union 
Solidarity House. ELRUM accused the company of discharging workers after they returned 
to work that in violation of the UAW contract, and the union of neglecting to provide the 
workers with representation.43  A month after the protest at the Solidarity House, the UAW 
responded directly to ELRUM in a letter sent to all UAW members.  The letter painted the 
Revolutionary Union Movements as nothing more than a fraternity of thugs and 
troublemakers, while claiming that the UAW had continuously fought for racial equality 
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since its beginnings in the 1930s.  It continued by directly referencing the Eldon Avenue 
strike as illegal and unnecessary and included a section declaring: 
The UAW, however, will not protect workers who resort to violence and 
intimidation with the conscious purpose of dividing our Union along racial 
lines: for these workers would undermine out Union, the principles upon 
which our Union was founded and put in jeopardy the jobs which our 
members hold.44 
 
By this point, it was clear that the UAW bureaucracy was inclined to protect its 
organizational interests, even by colluding with the companies, rather than take seriously the 
grievances prosecuted by the RUMs.45 
*** 
By early 1969, the constituent elements of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers were in place.  The RUMs had taken a firm stance against exploitation by the auto 
companies, life-threatening conditions in the plants, and the racist policies of both the 
companies and the UAW.  The students and writers who were now publishing Wayne State’s 
newspaper, The South End, had developed a solid anti-racist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist 
line and were adamant that Black workers represented this movement’s vanguard.  With the 
rise of new RUMs replicating the model and tactics of DRUM, it became clear that an 
organization was needed to harness the political potential and galvanize cohesion within the 
movement.  For this purpose the League of Revolutionary Black Workers was formed. 
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Chapter Three 
Chronology of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to effective external pressures placed on the RUMs from the auto-
industry, the UAW, and local police departments, it became increasingly evident that 
cooperation and planning was needed.  The League was created to serve as a democratic 
centralist organization that coordinated RUM activity and constituted a more developed 
revolutionary ideology.1 League activities include spearheading wildcat strikes, running and 
supporting radical Black candidates for union offices, and backing Black workers who had 
been wronged by either the company or the union that was supposed to be supporting them.  
As in the last chapter, I examine activities chronologically in order to show that at any given 
time mobilization is occurring on multiple fronts.  As I lay out this chronology, I hope to 
show that League intended to combat racial oppression and class exploitation simultaneously 
because, as they declare in their General Program, “our Black community is virtually a Black 
working class, because of our relationship to the basic means of production.  Black workers 
comprise the backbone of the productive process in this country”.2 
 
2. THE LEAGUE OF REVOLUTIONARY BLACK WORKERS MOBILIZED 
By March of 1969 different elements of the Detroit Black radical movement, 
including DRUM, FRUM, ELRUM, Wayne State students and South End writers, came 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The democratic centralist structure of the League represented aspirations rather than a fully 
developed Leninist party. 
2 The General Policy Statement and Labor Program of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers, n.d. Bx 1, Fd 86, ALEC, Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh. 
	  	  
53 
together to found the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in attempt to bring coordinate 
the actions of the Revolutionary Union Movements.  By June the League was legally 
incorporated and by October it had established a headquarters in Detroit at 179 Cortland St.  
The League would pick up steam and gradually add more member RUMs (although none 
would come to be as influential as DRUM and ELRUM), including JARUM (at Chrysler’s 
Jefferson Avenue assembly plant), UPRUM (United Parcel Service), HARUM (health 
workers), NEWRUM (Detroit News), MARUM (Mack Avenue plant), CADRUM 
(Cadillac’s Fleetwood factory), DRUMII (Dodge Truck), and MERUM (Mound Road engine 
plant).  Each member RUM acted semi-autonomously, but in accordance with the League’s 
general policy.3 
 A seven-man Executive Committee was appointed to direct the actions of the League; 
it included (ex)-factory workers General Baker, Luke Tripp, John Williams, and Chuck 
Wooten, students journalists John Watson and Mike Hamlin, and a young radical lawyer, 
Ken Cockrel.  This group, although young and inexperienced, kept tight reigns on the 
organization.4  They brought an interjection of Marxist rhetoric to the primarily nationalist 
rhetoric of the original RUMs.  However, they intended to “reinterpret Marxism in the 
language of the community” in order to relieve the already overburdened workers of “dead-
weighted… Marxist terminology.” They claimed: “the working class can change society at 
the point of production. But there are two working classes at this stage of American 
capitalism - Black and white.  The Blacks form a ‘subproletariat.’  They can be organized on 
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a caste basis, but can work revolutionary change on a class basis.”5  The differences between 
a more nationalist-inclined worker base and a Marxist-inclined leadership would become a 
source of friction as the League developed. 
 One of the League’s first courses of action was to draw up an explicit list of charges 
against the UAW International and send it to Walter Reuther.  They attacked the letter sent 
out by the UAW to the rank and file in the wake of the successful ELRUM strike on January 
27, 1969, asserting that it was “replete with untruths, distortions and exaggerations designed 
to heighten racial prejudice against militant black workers.”6 Furthermore, it threatened 
union members with non-representation in explicit violation of union by-laws.  The second 
charge stated that the UAW practiced racial discrimination, hiring less than 75 Black 
representatives for almost 1,100 Black employees.  This becomes especially problematic 
when you take into account “the special problems” that face Black workers.7  
 In a similar vein the League produced a letter making charges against Local 961, the 
local that represented workers at the Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle plant.  First, that the union 
allowed the employer to impede distribution of DRUM and ELRUM literature by 
confiscation, harassment, intimidation, and threats, when passed out in a legal manner; 
second, that the Local “has permitted, accepted, and reinforced the employer’s discrimination 
against black workers on racial criteria;” third, that the union failed to process grievances 
leading to work under “abnormally dangerous conditions;” fourth, that the union participated 
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in the suppression of ELRUM literature and tacitly endorsed the suppression by the 
company; fifth, that Black union members were illegally disqualified from voting in union 
elections in order to steal union control away from radical Black workers; and finally, that 
the union disqualified certain Black union members from being candidates for local office.8 
 During his tenure as Editor-in-Chief of The South End (September 1968-June 1969), 
John Watson caused quite a stir, producing articles with a revolutionary tone.  There was a 
three-part series honoring Malcolm X, numerous stories about the RUMs, and a masthead 
reading “One Class-Conscious Worker is Worth 100 Students.”  The paper’s edgy tone drew 
the attention of Wayne State’s President, certain groups of students, and in one case that of 
Detroit TV-2 reporter Joe Weaver.  On February 10, 1969 Weaver showed up to the South 
End office hoping to do an interview with John Watson regarding the controversial content in 
his newspaper.  Watson refused, and subsequently asked Weaver to leave.  The rest of the 
story is disputed, but while Watson and other members of the South End staff were in the 
process of escorting Weaver (and his crew) out of the office, Weaver and Watson exchanged 
blows.  Subsequently, Weaver filed charges against Watson.  Charged with assault and 
battery, the case centered around who “attacked” first.  In a trial that included competing 
testimony from witnesses, and a (partially obstructed) recording of the occurrence, Watson 
was acquitted after 22 minutes of deliberation by a jury made up of five white and one Black 
juror.9   
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 Ken Cockrel (the League’s resident lawyer) represented Watson during this trial, 
having only recently passed the Michigan bar exam. Since legal tie-ups can stall movements 
and drain resources (even when the accused is acquitted, as was Watson), this tactic was 
repeatedly employed against the League and its members.  Cockrel served as the lawyer for 
any League members who had charges brought against them and also defended Black 
workers and activists outside the League. 
 One such instance arose when the Republic of New Africa got into a shootout with 
the Detroit Police Department.  The RNA, a Black Nationalist group whose goal was to set 
up a separatist Black government in the southern United States, held its second annual 
“National Legislative Convention” at the New Bethel Baptist Church in Detroit, beginning 
on March 28, 1969.10  The RNA, with an openly militarized wing known as the Black 
Legion, had just finished escorting one of its leaders, Gaidi Obadele, out of the church and 
into a car located in an alley.  Two officers spotted the gathering and called in that they had 
seen several Black men with rifles.  It is uncertain what was said or who fired first, but a 
shootout promptly ensued that killed one officer severely wounded another.  Dozens of 
police officers massed at the scene as the RNA retreated back into the church.  In the 
subsequent shootout, several hundred shots were fired and four RNA members were injured.  
One hundred forty-two RNA members were arrested, booked, and put on “impromptu” trial 
that night.11  The League came to the aid of the RNA in by holding a “Cabaret Benefit” for 
the “New Bethel Defense Fund” in order to remunerate the four lawyers that worked on the 
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case pro bono.12  Secondly, Kenneth Cockrel, along with Justin Ravitz, O. Lee Molette, and 
Sheldon Halpern, successfully defended those charged in the New Bethel Incident.13 
 Drum simultaneously contested another election for Local 3 leadership, this one for 
vice-president.  DRUM decided to run Don Jackson, touted in the eleventh issue of the 
second volume of the DRUM newsletter as someone willing to risk his own livelihood for 
the good of Black workers, while casting his main competitor, Andy Hardy, as a sellout 
willing to put a Black face to the UAW and company’s racist policies.  They set up a 
campaign rally for Jackson to be held at Vernon Chapel on March 23.14  Both Andy Hardy 
and Don Jackson managed to move past the first round of the election, held on April 8, and 
into the runoff.  The fourteenth issue of this volume of DRUM urged Black voters to vote for 
Jackson even though abstention might be thought “justifiable since no matter who Black 
workers have elected in the past the results have been the same.  ‘No representation of Black 
workers by the U.A.W.’s Local 3.’”  They reiterated that Don Jackson would change the 
racist status quo.15  Despite this relatively successful campaign, Andy Hardy received 2,600 
votes in the runoff to Don Jackson’s 1,600. DRUM again charged that forces had been set in 
motion to counter its momentum.  In its fifteenth issue, the DRUM newsletter stated that on 
the day of the runoff the Detroit Police went to Jackson’s house and confiscated his license 
plates, accusing them of being stolen.  After a few hours they were returned, but not without 
successfully preventing Jackson’s car from being used to carpool voters to the polls.  The 	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newsletter further charged that retired workers were not properly identified and that voting 
machines were removed from the local the day after the elections, violating the UAW rule 
requiring a 72-hour waiting period before removal.16 
 The League took its first action on a national scale when it participated in the Black 
Economic Development Conference (BEDC, pronounced Bed-C), held in Detroit from April 
25-27. Sponsored by the National Council of Churches, the Episcopal Church, and the 
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO), along with other smaller 
organizations, BEDC was intended to be a lengthy discussion on current economic issues 
among Blacks and the future of Black prosperity.17  While Georgakas and Surkin speculate 
that some these organizations may have desired a discussion promoting Black Capitalism, the 
League and its allies steered the conference in the direction of Black Socialism.18 The 
keynote speaker, Robert S. Browne, asserted that the conference should work within 
economic and political restraints imposed by the white power structures, rather than combat 
the root issue, lack of Black access to these same power structures.19 Members of the League 
played a major part in the conference, as six of the seven members of the League’s executive 
committee were appointed to the BEDC’s 24-member steering committee. General Baker,the 
only member of the League’s executive committee not to be appointed, had refused to 
participate in the BEDC on ideological grounds. 
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 At the conference many speeches, covering an array of ideas were given.  James 
Boggs, who was closely associated with the League and had a plethora of experience as an 
autoworker and in communist movements spoke about “The Myth and Irrationality of Black 
Capitalism,” discussing the inseparability of the development of capitalism from the 
development of racism in the United States concluding, “development for the black 
community at this stage in history means social ownership, social change, social pioneering 
and social reconstruction.” 20 John Watson, in a speech titled “Objective Conditions Facing 
Black & Third World Workers,” associated semi-colonized Black Americans with colonized 
people in the “third world”, claiming that they lived under similar conditions.  Furthermore, 
Watson argued, these super-exploitative conditions were worsening as Nixon instated wage 
freezes while simultaneously allowing for increases in productivity via production line 
speedups.  And, since white and Black workers were continually pitted against one another 
the “old left” had given up its revolutionary ways, it was up to a Black and third world 
vanguard to organize the struggle against the corporate, capitalist, ruling class and build 
socialism around the world.21 
 James Forman’s Black Manifesto, calling for white Christian churches and Jewish 
synagogues to pay 500 million dollars in reparations, appears to have dominated discussion 
at the BEDC. Forman called for activists to read the document out loud, invited or not, to the 
preacher/priest/rabbi and the congregation during services.  The Manifesto called for the 
money to be spent to establish and support Black-controlled agriculture, media, research, 
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education, and support programs.22 Forman presented the manifesto for the first time at 
Riverside Church in New York on May 4, 1969.  This strategy generated more negative than 
positive responses; producing some resources, but nowhere close to the 500 million dollar 
goal.23 DRUM received $8,000 from this initiative with an indeterminate amount going to the 
League as well. Perhaps more consequentially, after the conference was over James Forman 
decided to remain in Detroit as a member of the League’s central staff of the League, 
gradually centralizing power for his own use.24 
 The League used much of these funds to establish infrastructure for political 
education: its own print shop, its own publisher, its own film production unit, and its own 
bookstore, under the marque “Black Star” and under the primary supervision of John Watson 
and Mike Hamlin.  Black Star produced several films, one on the history of the League titled 
Finally Got the News, and a second “dealing with drugs in the ghetto as well as an array of 
films on various revolutionary groups around the world.  The also published two pamphlets, 
one theoretically based by Ernie M. Kalimoto, and another entitled The Political Thought of 
James Forman.25 
 The most important and prominent of these productions was Finally Got the News.  
This hour-long documentary balances race and class analysis, historical tracing, and 
expressive anger.  Unlike similar documentaries made about the Black Panther Party and 
other similar groups at the time, members of the League played a crucial role in the 
production of this film.  The documentary opens with imagery of African children being sold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 James Forman, Black Manifesto, (proposal, Black Economic Development Conference, 
Wayne State University, April 25-27, 1969). 
23 Frye, “The ‘Black Manifesto’”, 65-76. 
24 Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 78-83. 
25 Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 146. 
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into slavery and slaves working the fields.  John Watson then links the use of slaves in the 
process of “primitive accumulation” and the growth of industrial capitalism to Black people’s 
current position: 
You’ll find that throughout the history of America that black people have been 
in that same position.  You find that that’s true today.  You don’t find too 
many black people that’s white collar workers.  You don’t find too many 
black people that are skilled tradesman.  You find other kinds of cats who are 
sitting in factories actually converting raw materials into finished products 
through their own sweat and blood.  I mean, that’s essentially what it is, you 
know, is the transformation of sweat and blood, literally, into finished 
products.26 
 
Continuing, the documentary addresses the abhorrent and inhumane safety conditions found 
in the plants and the irrationality of ownership under capitalism, “There’s a cat who will 
stand up and say to you he’s in mining, and he sits in an office on the 199th floor, and it’s a 
mother-fucking building on Wall Street, and he’s in mining.  He’s sitting up in Wall Street 
and his finger nails ain’t been dirty in his mother-fucking life.”27  They also show video of an 
important protest held during a UAW special convention at Cobo Hall where Black workers 
are gathered to demand representation from the union.  Towards the end the documentary 
addresses the position of white workers, who are also exploited and “for the most part 
recognize it,” yet tend to “blame the nigger on the street”, and the position of Black women 
who are forced into the workforce significantly more often than their white counterparts and 
despite their needs are the “last hired and first fired.” 28  The film enjoyed moderate success, 
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and was even picked up by a few paramilitary revolutionary groups in Italy as an example of 
how struggle could be waged.29 
 When Local 961 of the Eldon Avenue Gear and Axle plant was set to hold elections 
in May of 1969, ELRUM organized a slate of eight candidates either involved with the 
ELRUM movement or committed to the cause of combatting racism within the UAW and 
Chrysler: Elroy Richardson for president, James Franklin for recording secretary, Leon 
Johnson for treasurer, Fred Holsey (president of ELRUM), Robert McKee, and Charles Hale 
for trustee, Alonzo Chandler for union guide, and James Edwards for union steward for 
Departments 78, 80, and 82.. Before the election, The South End ran an article supporting 
ELRUM and these candidates.30  Three ELRUM candidates won runoffs including James 
Franklin for recording secretary, and Leon Johnson for treasurer.  Most notably, Elroy 
Richardson beat incumbent Ed Rickard, described by ELRUM as an “ass kisser whose basic 
concern is collecting union dues and keeping chairman of the board Lynn Townsend 
happy,”31 by a margin of 1,480-966.32  
  With contract negotiations with each of the big three auto companies impending 
(contracts were to expire on September 30, 1970), and a long fight anticipated, the UAW 
held a special convention to discuss strike benefits at Cobo Hall in Detroit on November 8-9, 
1969.  It was anticipated that more than 2,700 delegates from 1,500 locals would be in 
attendance.33 With economic conditions looking bleak, the Detroit News reported that Nixon 
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30 “ELRUM! We Will Win Without a Doubt”, The South End, May 14, 1969, Walter P. 
Reuther Library, Wayne State University. 
31 Newsletter, ELRUM Vol. 2 No. 4, The Real Deal, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, 
Northwestern University Library. 
32 “Militants of UAW Win Upset”, Detroit Free Press, May 18, 1969. 
33 Jack Crellin, “UAW Considers Strike Pay Boost”, Detroit News, November 8, 1969. 
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was calling on the union and companies to “exercise restraint in the areas of wages and prices 
in order to fight inflation”.  Reuther seemed less than keen on the idea replying, “Let the 
sacrifice be made by the people who can afford the sacrifice”.34   
The League saw this conference, however, as an opportunity to protest racism within 
the UAW and get some public exposure for its cause. Two different (although similar in 
content) flyers were produced to hand out around the plants and at Wayne State.  The flyer 
intended for workers claimed that, instead of raising strike benefits, Walter Reuther and his 
camp “are going to use this convention to raise the dues of the overtaxed, overworked, super-
exploited black workers in order to further line their pockets” and reemphasized the lack of 
Black representation within the union.  The march at Cobo Hall was set for November 9 at 11 
A.M.35 The League issued a hefty list of demands, calling for a Black UAW president and 
vice president, a revision of the grievance procedure, recognition of the League as “the 
official spokesman for black workers,” a doubling of the workforce, and an end to U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam war.36  A letter was also sent to Reuther in order to inform him 
of their plan to protest the event and provide him with a shortened list of their demands.37  
However the letter, along with other forms of intelligence-gathering may have prompted the 
UAW, as Geschwender suggests, to end the conference early on the 9th avoiding direct 
confrontation with League members.38  The League was joined by others displeased with the 
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P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University. 
36 Flyer, “Confront the Racist UAW Leaders”, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 24, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University. 
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direction of the Union, including the United Caucus, dissatisfied with present leadership; 30 
and Out, a group of young workers demanding that full pension be honored after thirty years 
of service regardless of age; and a white group allied with the League called the Detroit 
Revolutionary Organizing Committee.39 
Ushering in 1970, DRUM made another attempt to contest elections in Local 3.  With 
mid-March elections impending, DRUM planned a special convention scheduled for 
February 28 to be held at St. Josheph’s Church in order to vote on DRUM’s slate of 
candidates.  A flyer handed out to advertise the event explained that slate would feature 
Black revolutionaries exclusively, without “cutthroat pollacks, known white racists, and head 
scratching Uncle Toms”.  There were six criteria for participation in the convention:  
1. That you be Black; 2. That you be honest; 3. That you be committed to 
Black Liberation; 4. That you support DRUM’s program; 5. That you have a 
history of plant struggle; 6. That you have integrity.   	  The	  difference	  between	  honesty	  and	  integrity	  is	  clarified	  as	  “an	  honest	  person	  can	  be	  bought,	  a	  person	  with	  integrity	  cannot	  be	  bought”.40	  	  Candidates	  were	  decided	  through	  nominations	  made	  by	  convention	  attendees,	  defended	  and	  subsequently	  voted	  on	  by	  all	  in	  attendance	  	  41	  
The DRUM slate of candidates included Ron March for president, Don Jackson for 
vice-president, Gerald Wooten for financial secretary, Carlos Williams for treasurer, Charles 
Roberts, Betty Griffith, and Grover Douglas for trustee, Don Gaitor for Sergeant-at-arms, and 	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Laffayette Philyaw for guide.  DRUM also ran a long list of candidates for positions as 
delegates; Earl Robinson, “Big Mitch” McClellan, Jimmy Square, Raymond Johnson, Gerald 
Wooten, Charles Roberts, Ron March, Willie James Hutchinson, Grover Douglas, Joyce 
Bivins, Portia Redmond, Lee Cain, George E. Smith, Albert E. Hicks, Kenneth Roy 
Massengile, Richard Jackson, Jerome Harvard, Donald Jackson, Samuel Powe, Lafayette 
Philyaw. Eugine Watkins, Leon Pickett, George Carter, and Don Gaitor.  DRUM produced 
election flyers in both English and Arabic in order to appeal to a growing Arab workforce in 
Detroit who they felt suffered from similarly exploitative conditions.  It’s interesting to note 
that all of the candidates up for executive positions also ran for positions as delegates with 
the exception of Carlos Williams (treasurer) and Betty Griffith (trustee).42  Perhaps more 
compelling is the lack of success that DRUM had in this election, as the only candidates that 
were able to force a runoff were Carlos Williams and Betty Griffith.  Both lost.43  
DRUM released a special emergency newsletter charging electoral manipulation on 
March 17-18.  They claimed that when the polls opened only 3 voting machines were in 
working condition.  Furthermore, the levers for Ron March, Don Jackson, Gerald Wooten 
and several delegates malfunctioned throughout the day.  Stalling tactics were used,  such as 
kicking the plugs out of the sockets for many of the machines or opening curtains while 
voting was ongoing.  Many voters became frustrated and left the polls either without voting 
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or with an incomplete ballot.  The Hamtramck Police Department occupied the union hall, 
preventing DRUM protestors from challenging these tactics.44 
While DRUM was continuing its push into union electoral politics, a series of events 
(referred to on pages 29-31) involving the poor working conditions at the Eldon Avenue Gear 
and Axle Plant inspired more militant action by ELRUM and its allies.  On Wednesday, 
April 15, 1970 there was as dispute in Department 73 between a Black worker, John Scott, 
and his white foreman, Ervin Ashlock (who was accompanied by two other foremen).  The 
interaction occurred over a question concerning Scott’s production output.  It is unclear what 
exactly was said, but the foreman later claimed that he feared Scott intended to stab him 
because “he had his hand in his pocket.”  Ashlock “preemptively” threatened Scott by 
grabbing a pinion (weighing about 12 pounds) and telling Scott that he will “bash your brains 
in”.  A witness to the event said that Scott’s hand was never in his pocket.45 Chrysler 
responded by firing Scott and taking no action against Ashlock.46 
It seems that the union at least feigned concern, as they immediately called for a 
reinstatement for Scott and punishment for Ashlock, though without result.  ELRUM, in 
coordination with other radical groups in the plant, called for a wildcat, and around 6 P.M. on 
Thursday, April 16th most of the second shift workers left the plant.  They kept the plant shut 
down until the first shift Monday morning when employees returned on instruction from the 
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UAW.  The strike was a moderate success as John Scott was returned to his position with full 
back wages and Ashlock was transferred to a different plant.  A vote to retroactively 
authorize the wildcat was held on April 27th and passed with a 93% approval. The company 
agreed to take no reprisal, but on May 1st Chrysler fired six stewards and a trustee who had 
led the workers out of the plant during the April 16th wildcat.  At this point Local [3?] 
leadership (led by ELRUM-friendly president Elroy Richardson) authorized another wildcat 
strike that began at 12:30 A.M. on May 2.  Negotiations were ongoing, but the International 
Union was nowhere to be seen. The Chief Shop Committeeman and another steward lost 
their jobs, making a total of nine fired.  Four of the nine were eventually returned to work but 
only after sustaining monetary and disciplinary penalties.47  Out of this came a multiracial 
Eldon Workers’ Safety Committee, associated with ELRUM, which “researched the legal 
rights workers had in plants, organized interracial pickets, and distributed safety literature.”48 
Mamie Williams’ and Gary Thompson’s deaths occurred within this context, leading 
directly to a third wildcat strike led by the Eldon Workers’ Safety Committee and supported 
by ELRUM.  This one, it seems, did not garner as much support as the previous two, but it 
did elicit a response from the plant manager Harry T. Engelbrecht to all Eldon Avenue 
employees stating that he was “convinced that the vast majority of Eldon people want to 
come to work and want to perform their jobs conscientiously.”  He continued by implying 
that those leading the strike were not concerned with the welfare of the Eldon Avenue 
employees; “the fact that hundreds of our employees were deprived of their wages apparently 
did not concern them”.  Finally, he assured the employees that Chrysler was taking every 
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legal step “to insure your safety and to keep our plant operating. To this end, it was necessary 
to discharge those employees who were responsible for, or elected to participate in, the 
disruptions at our gates”.49  Four employees were terminated for participation in the strike: 
James Edwards, Alonzo Chandler, Robert McKee, and John Taylor.  Three of the four were 
members of ELRUM, and John Taylor was one of ELRUM’s closest white allies.50  The 
three wildcats during April and May cost Chrysler approximately 22,000 axles.51 
The most talked about Eldon Avenue incident occurred on July 15 when James 
Johnson walked into Department 78 and shot and killed two foremen and a jobsetter.  The 
League and ELRUM were active in his defense, even though he had never previously 
associated himself with the movement.  Kenneth Cockrel took on his defense assisted by 
white Marxist lawyer Justin Ravitz (another close League associate).  They argued that, per 
the constitutional guarantee of a jury of one’s peers, the trial jury had to be integrated in 
terms of both race and class. Out of twelve jurors, ten had work experience in Detroit, two 
were auto-workers, and three were married to auto workers.  The jury was also integrated by 
race and gender.  Georgakas and Surkin summarize Cockrel’s defense: 
The defense’s presentation was complex.  Johnson’s relatives and friends 
came from Mississippi to testify about his boyhood in one of the backwater 
regions of America.  They told all the familiar Southland horror tales.  These 
included an account of how a five-year-old James Johnson had seen the 
dismembered body of his cousin on a highway following a lynching.  The 
jury learned that Johnson had enlisted in the Army, only to be discharged for 
psychological problems.  They learned the details of a work history in which 
an inferior education and racism led from one poor job to another in a pattern 
characterized by emotional outbursts and threats from both Johnson and 
various employers.  They learned, too, that Johnson had finally found a 	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steady job at Eldon, where he had worked for three years supporting 
members of his family as well as himself.  His attorneys presented evidence 
that Eldon was one of the most dangerous plants in the United States and that 
the UAW was unable or unwilling to protect workers on the shop floor.  As a 
climax to the defense, Cockrel took the entire jury to the scene of the crime 
so they could judge conditions for themselves.52 
 
The jury eventually found that James Johnson was not responsible for his actions, and the 
judge, who disagreed with the jury’s ruling, “recommended most vehemently that Johnson be 
kept in custody for the rest of his natural life”,53 otherwise, he contested, Johnson would kill 
again. Johnson suffered extreme racial harassment while institutionalized, but he did 
eventually receive a worker’s compensation ruling in his favor providing $75 a week and 
requiring that Chrysler provide back pay from the time the incident occurred.54 
 By fall of 1970 the League appeared to make a strategic shift away from direct plant 
involvement.  By this time, most of the most active and radical members of the League and 
the RUMs had been systematically terminated from the plants, and the companies along with 
the union saw to it that radical voices within the plants were silenced.  Some of the League’s 
remaining resources went to establish a book club called Control, Conflict, and Change.  
Some of the the League cadre saw the establishment of the book club as an important step in 
political education.  However, the club didn’t reach its intended demographic as its 700 
person membership was made up mostly of white middle class liberals, with only a spattering 
of radicals.  Furthermore, only two percent of its membership was Black.  It did however 
expose unlikely candidates to the likes of W.E.B. Du Bois, Karl Marx, and Rosa 
Luxembourg among other important radical writers.55 
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 In May of 1971 Elroy Richardson was up for reelection as president of Local 961.  
ELRUM by this point had determined that Richardson was no radical. so they threw their 
support behind the more controversial Jordan Sims.  Sims was actively involved in the 1970 
strikes and had engaged in numerous confrontations with management.  The first round of 
the election took place on May 14-15 and ended in Sims going into a runoff with Frank 
McKinnon, a white worker who was also involved in the 1970 wildcats (Elroy Richardson 
finished third). The runoff election, held on May 26-27, attracted more than 2,000 voters; 
Jordan Sims lost by just 36 votes.  Furthermore, 254 votes were disqualified on charges of 
delinquency on union dues.56  Sims contested the results and eventually won a second runoff 
election under the rationale that there was confusion about who should and shouldn’t be 
voting.57  Sims lost the new election by twelve votes, but two years later (after the dissolution 
of ELRUM and the League) was successfully elected as president of Local 961.58 
 In an attempt to expand the Revolutionary Union Movement beyond Detroit to a 
national scale, members of the League proposed creation of a Black Workers Congress, an 
organization independent of the League, of which the League would be an influential 
component.59 This ambitious endeavor was undermined by declining plant activity, limited 
resources, and ideological conflict.  Before the founding convention of the BWC in 
September of 1971, three members of the League Executive Committee, Michael Hamlin, 
John Watson, and Kenneth Cockrel (along with James Foreman), resigned from League 	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activity.60  They cited “class and ideological contradictions” as the reason for leaving.61  The 
remaining members of the League responded with accusations that the aforementioned group 
was petty bourgeois and feared the “dictatorship of the proletariat”.62   The League was then 
expelled from the Black Workers Congress as the separatists took over planning.  Although 
around 500 people attended the founding convention for the BWC, neither the remnants of 
the League or the burgeoning BWC would survive beyond 1972.63  
***  
 Thus the League lasted for only a short time, but some scholars have suggested that 
the League represented one of the most politically sophisticated manifestations of the Black 
Power movement.  Although replete with contradictions, the League effectively contested the 
powers that be, forcing both the UAW and the auto companies to address their existence 
through repression and denial of resources.  Moving forward, I would like to analyze the 
actions of the UAW and auto companies that repressed League activities and restricted its 
access to resources in order to show that without these external pressures the League could 
have continued to mobilize against capitalism and racism at the point of production.
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Chapter Four 
 
Analysis of External Demobilization Factors 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the past three chapters I have traced the history of Black automobile workers in the 
city of Detroit, along with their relationship with the companies and the union. Despite the 
UAW’s promise during the 1942 Ford unionization campaign to fight for racial equality, 
Black workers still suffered from poorer conditions, less access to white collar and skilled 
jobs, and less representation in the UAW.  In this context, two elements, the Revolutionary 
Union Movements and radical newspapers, would join together to become the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers.  The RUMs targeted companies at the point of production via 
wildcat strikes and targeted unions during local elections by appealing to a nationalist 
ideology, while receiving coverage from the radical newspapers that they otherwise would 
not have received from mainstream media. The League served to coordinate various RUM 
activities, and propagate these activities through different written and media organs.   
 The League functioned with substantial external constraints.  As anticipated, the 
targeted companies, Chrysler, Ford, and GM, reacted with hostility and actively attempted to 
dismantle the Black radical forces mobilized against them. The UAW used its full 
institutional resources and Red Scare tactics to demobilize the League. Martin Glaberman 
argues that after Ford was unionized the union was incorporated into the management of the 
plant through full-time employment of committeemen and a union dues check-off (as 
opposed to individual payments).1  Rather than recognize the material conditions of Black 
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auto workers relative to white auto workers that led to the existence of Black radical groups 
such as DRUM/ELRUM and the League, the UAW actively combatted radical Black 
workers’ groups, while simultaneously claiming that “our union has done more to further the 
Black man’s cause than any other in the nation.”2 Finally, local police forces acted in 
congruence with company and union to bring legal legitimacy to the constraints put on the 
League. Therefore, pressure on the League was being exerted from three separate points: the 
companies, the UAW, and local police forces.  Demobilizing force from companies 
(capitalist entities) and the local police (enforcers of private property) is expected; that 
coming from the union (supposed representative of the working class), less so. 
 In this chapter I will analyze how the League was affected by the external 
demobilizing, repression and via resource deprivation.  Christian Davenport describes 
repression as “coercive actions undertaken by political authorities directed against someone 
challenging their beliefs, institutions, and actions or the context or conditions within which 
the government exists.”3  While this is an adequate definition of what repression’s means 
(coercive action) and targets (challengers), it limits the repressing group to the state.  In this 
case, repression was undertaken by powerful and politically influential companies and the 
union, as well as the state.  Davenport describes resource deprivation as “the systematic 
hindering of SMO efforts to generate the human and financial resources necessary to 
continue engaging in challenging behavior.”  He continues, by explaining that “one of the 
only consistent findings relevant to the topic of interest that has been explored is that 
moderate SMOs (aimed at reform and nondisplacement of leaders) are likely to receive 	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Republic of New Africa, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 29. 
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resources from funding organizations” as opposed to radical movements seeking changes in 
leadership and ideology.4 I hope to show that these two external factors - especially the 
UAW’s repression and denial of resources - led to the removal of the most radicalized 
workers in the plants from positions of influence.  This, I will claim, was the primary causal 
factor in the demobilization of the League. 
While repression of the League came from three agents - the companies, the UAW, 
and the state - those agents tended to function in a coordinated manner.  One example of a 
basic timeline of repressive events goes as follows, The League takes a dissenting action (i.e. 
strike, running for union office); the challenged responds with a repressive action (i.e. firing 
workers, hindering Black worker votes); the League files grievances and claims wrongdoing; 
the UAW (Local or International) either makes no attempt at addressing the wrong or cuts a 
deal that allows for racial moderates to return to work or maintain influence in the union 
(eliminating more radical union militants); if need be, the police step in to repress worker 
militancy until order is restored.   
 Repression demobilized the League most effectively by limiting League and RUM 
members and their sympathizers’ access to employment and office.  This meant firing (and 
subsequently not rehiring) them as leaders of wildcat strikes, preventing radicals from 
gaining legitimized power in the union machine, and explicitly targeting Black workers who 
acted more militantly than union officials preferred.  These acts of reprisal pressured workers 
remaining in the plants to distance themselves from the radical organizations. 
The League of Revolutionary Black Workers and its affiliates constantly functioned in a state 
of extreme financial constraint.  Funds for the organization came primarily from the salaries 
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and savings of its leadership, as well as voluntary donations from members.  The League 
pushed for but was never able to obtain compulsory dues allocation from the checks of Black 
workers, and as such never obtained a steady stream of financial resources.  However, the 
League devised ways to obtain resources via other channels such as fund-raisers, 
participation in the Black Economic Development Conference, and in one instance winning 
elections that allowed it to control Wayne State University’s newspaper (with access to its 
budget for production and distribution, as well as plebiscitary legitimization of its power).  
For the purposes of this thesis, resources include finances, human resources, and access to 
legitimized power.  I believe that access to legitimized power allows for access to an 
indeterminate amount of resources beyond what is readily quantifiable.   
This chapter will first cover the six strikes organized entirely or partly by DRUM/ELRUM.  
Second, three protests of the UAW organized by the League and its affiliates will be 
examined.  Third will be analyzed company disciplinary actions taken against workers in the 
struggle against racial oppression and exploitation as this is a particularly important form of 
repression in the demobilization of the League.  Fourth, five local elections participated in by 
League affiliates, three Local 3 and two Local 961, will come in for scrutiny.  Finally, the 
state’s role in repression and resource deprivation via surveillance, arrest, trial, and restraint 
on publication at Wayne State University will be considered. Wherever possible, I 
compartmentalize repression and resource deprivation, but in many instances these two 
sources of external demobilization were so tightly juxtaposed that they must be considered as 
an ensemble.  A summary of the forms of repression and resource deprivation is provided in 
table format at the end of the chapter.
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2. REPRESSION AND RESOURCE DEPRIVATION 
 League-associated groups were the primary actors in wildcat strikes six times during 
the existence of the RUMs,  two under the direction of DRUM and four under the direction 
of ELRUM (although three of the four occurred in close and related succession).1  The strikes 
occurred in reaction to “niggermation”, unsafe working conditions, or UAW/company 
repression of other RUM/League activities.  Some were supported by a mix of Black and 
white workers, others primarily by Black workers.  Finally, each strike met repression from 
the company, the UAW, the local police, or a combination of the three, systematically 
removing the most radical elements of the movement from employment or office. 
A proto-DRUM wildcat began on May 2, 19682 due to a drastic speedup (see pages 
39-40).  Although Black and white workers participated equally in the three-day work 
stoppage, punishment was disproportionately handed out to Black workers; five out of seven 
workers fired were Black, and nine out of ten workers suspended were also Black.  Out of 
these workers, only two were permanently terminated: General Baker Jr, and Bennie Tate, 
two of the most radicalized workers in the plant and both future members of DRUM.3 
 The second DRUM strike lasted for four days and began on July 8, 1968 (see pages 
43-45) in response to Local 3’s refusal to address racism and unsafe conditions within the 
plant.  This time only Black workers were approached, and (with only a spattering of white 
sympathizers) Black workers made up the majority of the 3,000 person picket line.  During 
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the course of the strike, protests were also set up at Local 3 and Chrysler’s headquarters in 
order to demand concessions; of course none were granted.  Repression occurred from the 
first day when the police showed up in riot gear to disperse the picketers at Dodge Main 
(Hamtramck Police Department) and the protesters at Chrysler Headquarters (Highland Park 
Police Department).  Further repression occurred on the following Monday (the fourth day of 
the shutdown) when police issued cease and desist orders to remaining picketers.  The UAW 
eventually arranged for 12 DRUM leaders to meet with the UAW caucus in an attempt to 
subsume the younger more radical workers under a racially moderate UAW-sponsored 
group.4 
 The first ELRUM strike occurred on January 27, 1969 and lasted only one day (see 
pages 49-51).  It occurred in the wake of a massive purge of radical Black workers who had 
gathered at Local 961 in order to demand rights for Black workers in the plant causing many 
workers to be late to their shift.  Just as at the second DRUM strike, the picket lines were 
made up primarily of Black workers, while white workers were not impeded in entering the 
facility.  In response the company tripled “plant protection guards,” and increased plant 
security measures, installing security cameras, and increasing lighting fixtures.  Furthermore, 
the Detroit Police Department was put on 24-hour patrol in the neighborhood of the plant.  
After the strike, according to the Detroit Free Press, 25 Black workers were discharged “at 
random” for “misconduct”.5  What is more, the UAW did not offer any of these workers 
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representation, calling them “separatists” and accusing them of “violent acts”.  While many 
of the workers eventually were returned to work, two permanently lost their jobs, including 
the president of ELRUM, Fred Holsey.6 
 The final three ELRUM strikes occurred in rapid succession between April 16, 1970 
and May 27, 1970, inspired by a series of deaths or firings of John Scott, Mamie Williams, 
and Gary Thompson (see pages 66-68).  Each strike was supported by white and Black 
workers (although it is likely that Black workers made up the majority).  It is notable that 
ELRUM maintained a loose but fickle alliance with Elroy Richardson, President of Local 
961, at this time. Six stewards and one trustee were terminated sixteen days after the original 
walkout despite a retroactive approval of the strike within the Local and Chrysler having 
given its word that it would not take disciplinary action against participating workers.  A 
second strike, ordered by Elroy Richardson in response to these firings, resulted in the firing 
Jordan Sims, a chief shop committeeman, and another steward.  Four of the seven stewards 
fired would eventually gain back employment, but not unconditionally. Clarence Thornton, 
largely considered a “good steward”, was obliged to sign a contract stating that if he caused 
any more trouble he would be fired permanently.  As a result, when James Johnson 
approached him just over a month later for help, he was unable to do anything, which 
eventually led to Johnson killing three people in the plant.  The third wildcat, after Gary 
Thompson’s death, directly led to the firing of three ELRUM members (James Edwards, 
Alonzo Chandler, and Robert McKee), as well as ELRUM’s closest white ally (John Taylor).  
The plant manager, Harry T. Engelbrecht, also sent a letter to all Eldon Avenue Employees 	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condemning radicals for disrupting production as harmful to the employees themselves.  This 
chain of events clearly shows a systematic effort to rid the plant of voices speaking out 
against unsafe working conditions and racist practices.7 
The RUMs and League would also instigate protests at their locals and the UAW 
headquarters.  These protests would not produce repression as explicit or blatant as that seen 
during and in the wake of wildcat strikes because the union found it easy to deflect the 
protests. The RUMs/League would present their demands, and union leaders would either 
feign interest in supporting the workers or practice outright avoidance.  
 Actions in the wake of the two DRUM wildcats of 1968 demonstrate the union’s 
unwillingness to support the demands of the Black workers, and more cynically 
systematically remove power from the hands of the most radically inclined in the movement. 
While the union claimed to have worked out a deal to bring five of seven terminated workers 
back to Dodge Main conditionally if the union removed its strike vote, they insisted that it 
was impossible to get the other two (General Baker Jr. and Bennie Tate) back to work. 
DRUM members and other Black workers responded to this by chanting “seven or none”.   A 
union steward, Edith Fox, then suggested that the two workers be put on the union payroll 
instead, a suggestion that DRUM agreed to.  However, Ed Liska, president of Local 3, 
refused to allow a vote on this motion, causing DRUM workers to storm out.8 
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 On January 22, 1969, ELRUM held a protest of about 300 workers at Local 961, 
listing 19 demands (see page 49).   Local union leadership again refused to hear the 
grievances of its constituency or to view it first hand.  This time, however, repression came 
from the company as two Black workers were fired while many others were suspended for 
missing work.  It is illegal to punish an employee missing work on union business, so 
Although there is no evidence that the local asked Chrysler to fire these workers as a warning 
to the radicals, the UAW could have contested these firings by claim the workers as being 
“on official union business,” since it is illegal to punish an employee for missing work on 
union business.  These terminations and suspensions led to the ELRUM wildcat beginning on 
January 27, 1969.9 
 In response to the League-wide protest at the UAW’s special convention at Cobo Hall 
on November 9, 1969 (see pages 62-64), the union adjourned the convention before the 
protest got started.  This allowed union leadership to avoid direct confrontation at the 
meeting, a sly but effective way to repress ideas.  Still the protest proceeded, and images of 
the march can be seen in the movie about the League Finally Got the News.10 
One of the main ways that the companies were able to demobilize the League after 
strikes and protests was by terminating the most radical workers.This restricted the power of 
the Revolutionary Union Movements by making in-plant organizing difficult if not 
impossible.  Furthermore, union locals and the UAW International were pleased to see 
radical elements of the union displaced from their rank-and-file.  Two other important types 	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of disciplinary actions were used to intimidate workers and deter them from participating in 
the RUMs.  The fire-rehire threatened the worker (and family) with joblessness, sometimes 
creating a sense of gratefulness upon regaining employment.  The period of joblessness could 
last anywhere from a few days to several months, and back pay was not guaranteed.  It is 
important to note that sometimes workers were rehired without UAW intervention, as 
companies occasionally decide to bring back a fired employee rather than pay the expense of 
searching, hiring, and training a new employee. Suspensions were usually unpaid and lasted 
between five days and a month.  Victims of both the fire/rehire and the suspension were often 
reinstated with harsh warnings and stipulations about participating in strikes or supporting 
“illegal” union actions within the plant that dissuaded workers from further radical activity, 
at least openly.   
Over the course of the six strikes and three union protests documented in this paper 
nine of the most radical and politically involved workers were fired.  Two others, Chuck 
Wooten, a member of the League’s executive committee, and Sydney Lewis, a high-ranking 
member of the League, were fired from Dodge Main for reasons not directly related to strikes 
or protests, bringing the total to eleven.  Other prominent League/RUM members to be 
permanently fired were General Baker (cofounder of DRUM and the League), Fred Holsey 
(President of ELRUM), Jordan Sims (radical worker and union Local 961 candidate), Bennie 
Tate (high-ranking League member), James Edwards, Alonzo Chandler, and Robert McKee 
(ELRUM members), and John Taylor (white ELRUM/League ally).  Also as a direct result of 
the events analyzed in this paper between 34 and 40 Black workers associated with the 
League and/or the RUMs were fired/rehired.  At least 20 of these were confirmed members 
of ELRUM but the number is likely higher when DRUM and the League are taken in 
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consideration (unfortunately this information is unavailable).  Between 49 and 69 workers 
were suspended for their actions and it is unclear how many were confirmed members of the 
League/RUMs.  The numbers aforementioned represent known estimates and should be 
considered as conservative, as it is likely that other members and affiliates received 
disciplinary action that was not directly related to the strikes or protests.11 
 A successful showing in union local elections could potentially have built the 
burgeoning Radical Union Movement.  RUMs alleged that union locals unions engaged in 
acts of repression including but not limited to hindering Black UAW members from voting, 
beatings, disqualifying votes, intimidation, and encouraging retired workers (more likely to 
be white and racist, but unlikely to participate without outreach) to exercise their right to 
vote.  Ultimately, the UAW locals were overwhelmingly successful in preventing radical 
Black workers from obtaining union office, usually resulting in the election of moderate 
Blacks, more conducive to the UAW’s collaborative approach to labor relations. 
ELRUM and DRUM participated in five elections, running or supporting 20 
candidates for local executive offices and 24 candidates for delegate positions.  The 
candidates’ range of association with the RUMs spanned from loosely associated to president 
of a RUM.  They also spanned across each executive position at the locals, including three 
runs for president, two for vice-president, and multiple runs for trustee.  Of the 20 candidates 
that ran for executive office, three ran successfully although many others ran close races that 
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forced runoffs.12 However, the three winning candidates were among those more loosely 
associated with the RUMs.  While it is difficult to verify every claim of repression that the 
RUMs and the League assert it would be difficult to imagine all of the claims being 
fabricated, and it is easy to imagine, given the UAW’s open hostility to the Black radical 
unions, and the racism prevalent among the rank and file of the UAW, that some 
underhanded work occurred.   
In the first election (see pages 45-47), Ron March, a candidate for trustee of Local 3, 
was able to force a runoff against incumbent Joe Elliott despite severe repression.  According 
to DRUM claims, Ron March was the only candidate prevented from placing campaign signs 
in the plant.  The Hamtramck Police Department got ticketed Ron March campaign workers 
(though no others) who were providing carpool services to March supporters.  These 
vehicles, vital to bringing in March supporters who may have otherwise been unable to vote, 
were also impeded by police officers who took unnecessarily long to write the citations.  
March’s victory in the first election incited extreme violence against his, supporters including 
axe handle beatings and mace sprayings perpetrated by the HPD that were witnessed by both 
the Hamtramck mayor and chief of police.  The runoff election incited an unprecedented 
propaganda campaign, including an article written in the Michigan Chronicle to dissuade 
Black workers close to retirement from combatting the status quo.  Local 3 sent out a letter 
pleading with retired workers, most of them racist Polish-Americans, to exercise their right to 
vote, claiming falsely that if March won he would threaten their retirement benefits.  Finally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It is unclear how many (although it is likely that none) of the delegate candidates won their 
respectful elections. 
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March obtained statements from workers stating that they were fearful of voting due to police 
presence.13   
When Don Jackson ran for vice-president of Local 3 (see pages 57-58), the UAW 
International sent a letter sent to all its members condemning Black radicals as separatists.  
DRUM also charged that they were not permitted to inspect the voting machines, which were 
removed from the precincts before the required 72-hour waiting period ended.  The Detroit 
Police Department confiscated Don Jackson’s license plates and accused him of grand theft 
auto, thereby preventing him from helping to carpool voters to the polls.  Finally, when three 
members of DRUM filed formal protest, they were all arrested on their way home.14   
 ELRUM’s first attempt at union electoral politics (see page 62) was also the League’s 
first successful bid for office.  Of eight candidates that ELRUM endorsed in the May 1969 
Local 961 election, three won, including, Elroy Richardson for president, James Franklin for 
recording secretary, and Leon Johnson for treasurer.15  To the best of my knowledge, 
ELRUM made no claims of election corruption; two factors may have contributed to this.  
First, the successful election of three out of eight candidates may have seemed a moderate 
victory within the context of the repressive conditions confronting the League and RUMs, so 
it may have seemed best to those strategists to emphasize short-term success in order to 
encourage further participation.  Second, union reaction to candidates such as Elroy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “The Dodge Rebellion”, Ramparts Magazine, November 30, 1968, 12.  Derrick Morrison, 
“Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement”, Young Socialist, November 1968, 10-11, 18.  
Newsletter, DRUM, Vol. 1, No. 15, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, Northwestern University 
Library. 
14 Newsletter, DRUM, Vol. 2, No. 15, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Northwestern University Library. 
Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 114-15. 
15 “ELRUM! We Will Win Without a Doubt”, The South End, May 14, 1969, Walter P. 
Reuther Library, Wayne State University.  Newsletter, ELRUM Vol. 2 No. 4, The Real Deal, 
BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, Northwestern University Library 
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Richardson may have been less extreme as he was less closely associated with ELRUM than 
were previous DRUM candidates.  Richardson would come to show after his election that his 
relationship with ELRUM was tenuous. 
In mid-March of 1970, DRUM ran an entire slate of candidates in the Local 3 
elections (see pages 64-66), nine for executive positions, and 24 for delegates.  Despite being 
RUM’s most ambitious electoral run, only three executive candidates forced runoffs and 
none were elected.  It is unclear how the candidates for delegate faired, but it is likely that 
they did nearly as poorly or as poorly as the candidates for executive positions.  DRUM 
would claim in a newsletter entitled Pigs in the Polls 
On Wednesday morning at 5:00 A.M. when the polls opened only 3 voting 
machines were in working condition and all day Thursday levers on various 
voting machines were broke.  Ron Marchs’ [sic] lever was broken all day 
long and Don Jackson’s lever was broken all evening.  Gerald Wooten’s lever 
was out off and on all day and many delegate’s [sic] levers were broken.  
Plugs were being kicked out of their sockets and lights going out on machines.  
Curtains were flying open in the middle of votes, registering the vote before 
the voter was finished.  Many votes were lost because Black brothers became 
frustrated and left the Local hall because of all the confusion.  A Hamtramck 
Fireman came in and began opening every voting machine and refused to 
show any I.D.  
 
They go on to say that when DRUM supporters went to the union hall to protest the terrible 
conditions they were “forcibly evicted” by the Hamtramck Police Department.16   
In the final ELRUM election, running Jordan Sims (see page 70), the first round took 
place on May 14 and 15 1971. Sims contested Elroy Richardson who had fallen out of favor 
with ELRUM due to what they saw as a lack of action for the Black working class and a 
second challenger Frank McKinnon.17 Sims won a plurality by a margin of 806 votes to 739 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Report, DRUM Special Pigs in the Polls, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 10, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University.  Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 115-17 17	  There	  were	  other	  candidates	  but	  these	  three	  would	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over second place McKinnon and a runoff election was scheduled for May 26 and 27. During 
the runoff armed guards occupied the voting facilities.  Also, as the election was won by 
McKinnon 36 votes (1,178-1,142), it was important that 254 votes were disqualified on the 
pretense that the voters were delinquent on their union dues.  The vote was challenged on 
both accounts, but was only granted on the account that it was unclear who should and 
shouldn’t be voting.  Armed guards were still used in the redo of the runoff and Jordan Sims 
lost the revote by 12 votes.18 
The same repression that stymied DRUM and ELRUM candidates for union office 
prevented the League from gaining access to financial resources and legitimated power.  As 
executives of Locals 3 and/or 961, League and RUM members could have directed resources 
toward their organizations’ projects.  They could have provided support to employees fired 
and disciplined for participating in wildcats.  They also would have been in position to put 
pressure on the International to step in and take a stance against racism within the union.  
Furthermore, it would have brought recognition to the RUMs and allowed for growth in 
terms of human resources, by way of attracting membership to existing RUMs and opening 
up avenues to new RUMs in Detroit and eventually elsewhere.  Most importantly, they could 
have pushed the union to do more to protect the rights of workers, particularly Black 
workers, that the union defended weakly if at all in its drive to cooperate with the auto 
companies. 
It is clear that the Detroit Police Department was keeping close tabs on the League 
and its members.  One revealing DPD file shows that they were keeping detailed records on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Letter, Law Offices of Glotta, Adelman, and Dinges, October 15, 1971, Bx 2, Fd 11, 
DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University; Letter, Leonard Woodcock, 
UAW Response to Jordan Sims, November 8, 1971, Bx 2, Fd 15, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University; Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 201-02. 
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General Gordon Baker’s activities and associates during the 60s and early 70s, including 
records of his associations with all of the members of the League executive committee and 
other influential members of DRUM and the League.  It was not uncommon for undercover 
police officers to follow Baker during everyday activities, for instance leaving home and 
heading to work at the Dodge Main Plant.  In another instance, an officer followed him from 
his home to the laundry mat, then out to the liquor store for a six-pack, and back to the 
laundry mat, until he went home.  It also shows that the DPD sent undercover informants to 
League events such as the October 1969 rally at Chrysler Headquarters, the November 1969 
protest at Cobo Hall, and the May 1971 demonstration at Solidarity House.  While the file on 
General Baker was the only one that I was able to access, it would be surprising if files on 
other prominent League members such as John Watson and Kenneth Cockrel were not also 
kept.  Another file was on the League specifically that kept many of its publications and 
propaganda materials.19 
The League was fortunate to have Ken Cockrel, a young, talented, revolutionary 
lawyer on their executive committee, but this did not prevent various groups from using legal 
tactics to tie members of the League up in court, thereby draining its financial resources and 
forcing it to devote time to legal defense that could otherwise have been used to mobilize. 
Cockrel remarks that “[m]ost all of the members of our central staff had to go to trial 
sometime in the year of 1969”. Mike Hamlin, Chuck Wooten, John Williams, John Watson, 
and Luke Tripp of the Executive Committee were put on trial, in addition to DRUM leader 
Ron March and ELRUM president Fred Holsey.  While Cockrel and his partners had great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Detroit Police Department, General Gordon Baker Jr. Files, BPM4 Reel 2/3, Microfilm, 
Northwestern University Library. 
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success in defending League and RUM members - none were convicted20 - consistent legal 
pressure on prominent radicals in the League acted as constant drain on the League’s 
resources.  I would like to focus on one case in particular involving Ken Cockrel as the 
defendant. 
 Cockrel was charged with contempt of court on April 19, 1969 as he was defending 
Alfred Hibbitt, a man accused in the New Bethel incident.  During the presentation of the 
defense’s case, Judge Joseph Maher declared that he was finished listening to the defense as 
they were embarking of a “fishing expedition,” and then proceeded to increase Hibbitt’s bail 
from $25,000 to $50,000.21  In reaction, Cockrel exclaimed, “We’ve got a judge here who 
doesn’t know anything about the law, and I’ll state that categorically.  We’ve got a judge 
here who is himself lawless and a law violator… They’re not judges, they’re prosecutors, 
they’re not police; they’re racists, rogues bandits, thieves and pirates… This honkie dog fool 
who calls himself a judge: this racist honkie who violated a law we didn’t even write,” and 
that by doing this was denying his client due process.  Cockrel’s defense took place in late 
May (after over a month of preparation) and consisted of a legal team of seven prominent 
area lawyers (excluding Cockrel himself).  They set out to prove that Cockrel was not only 
not in contempt of court, but that every one of his statements was true.  Legal experts, 
lawyers and judges, from across the country were prepared to speak on his behalf against the 
Maher’s actions.  After the first day of court ended in an extended six-day recess, the charges 
were dropped and Maher agreed to decrease Hibbitt’s bail to $10,000.  Cockrel said of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Dan Georgakas, and Marvin Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban 
Revolution, 3rd ed. (Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2012) 74-75, 165. 
21 We needn’t explore the fact that bail, as an institution is racist and classist in and of itself. 
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trial, “This is a vindication of the position we took.  I have no regrets for what I said, I think 
my characterizations were accurate”.22 
This case serves as only one example of the time and financial strain that legal 
proceedings can have on a movement.  This was true in the case of John Watson (see pages 
55-56) as well as any number of others that occurred during the existence of the RUMs and 
the League.  While it may be a stretch to call the number of cases a conspiracy against the 
movement, it would be an oversight to ignore important role that legal proceedings had in 
drawing time and resources away from plant strikes and union protests.  Furthermore, despite 
the success of Ken Cockrel and his partners at defending members of the League from 
convictions, it is clear that resources and energy were spent just to keep key members of the 
movement out of jail and able to continue to wage struggle against the exploitative forces. 
As editor-in-chief of Wayne State University’s student newspaper, John Watson 
turned The South End into a revolutionary organ reporting not only on radical movements 
across the globe (e.g. Palestine, Cuba, and South Vietnam), but primarily on the various 
manifestations of the Black power movement occurring in the United States.  As editor John 
Watson had access to “a daily run of 18,000, a printing budget of $100,000, an editor’s salary 
of $2,400, and a staff payroll of 23,400”.23 Watson used these resources to distribute the 
paper not only to Wayne State students, but also in the Black working-class neighborhoods 
where he had previously distributed The Inner City Voice.  However, this did not come 
without controversy and pushback.  The paper came under particularly strong fire for its open 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Newspaper article, John Oppedahl, Cockrel Cleared of Charges, “The Detroit News”, June 
4, 1969, Bx 2, Fd 7, DGC, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University.  Newspaper 
article, Kathy Warbelow, Comrade Cockrel: The Marxist who would be Mayor, n.d., Bx 2, 
Fd 7, DGC, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University.   
23 Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 44. 
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support of Palestinians in their fight against Israeli oppression and displacement. In one 
instance, a right wing student group calling itself the New Wayne Committee collected 2,000 
signatures asking WSU President William R. Keast to remove the radical newspaper editor.24  
WSU President William R. Keast, also saw The South End’s coverage as problematic, 
although he did reluctantly admit that John Watson had a right to stay on as editor-in-chief.  
In a revealing letter from William R. Keast to John Watson, which Watson published in the 
February 10, 1969 edition of The South End, it is clear that Watson and Keast had had 
multiple meetings and that Keast pleaded with Watson to tone down the rhetoric and 
“balance” the coverage by covering more university-based activities. In the letter Keast 
claimed: 
I now say to you in candor and in disappointment, that I have not seen any 
substantial evidence of progress toward the objective of a strong, 
independent, and responsible student paper… I cannot believe that this kind 
of performance, and these results, are what you and your colleagues on the 
South End staff intend… I urge you to reconsider immediately the position of 
the paper and your responsibilities as its editor.25 
 
While Keast was ultimately unsuccessful in ousting Watson as editor, he was successful in 
inducing the paper to tone down its rhetoric and include more “university relevant” 
material.26  While this does not represent a seizing of resources, it does show that groups in 
power can exercise indirect control over the use of resources even when radicals in direct 
possession of those resources use them legally. 
*** 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “Student Petition Hits WSU Paper”, Detroit Free Press, February 19, 1969. 
25 William R. Keast, Letter to John Watson, South End, February 10, 1969, Walter P. Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University.  
26 Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency, 149. 
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 In this chapter I have examined two ways that external pressures acted upon the 
League to demobilize it.  The first was repression from three actors: the companies, the 
UAW, and the state (police departments).  These groups repressed the League through 
continuous surveillance, by terminating and disciplining radical workers, and by committing 
election fraud.  Repression acted as a demobilizer by displacing the most radical elements of 
the movement from positions of influence, creating an environment of intimidation that 
pushed sympathizers away from association with the League and the RUMs.  The second 
form of external pressure was resource deprivation.  Resource deprivation dug into already 
scarce financial resources, monopolized time and effort of key organizers, diverted the use of 
certain resources into more moderate avenues, and denied the League legitimized power.  A 
systematic external assault on the most radical elements of the movement, the denial and 
removal of these elements from positions of power or influence, all within the context of a 
union that was ambivalent at best and malevolent at worst, caused the League to begin to 
demobilize.  
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Table 4.1 Repression and Resource Deprivation 
Event/ Perpetrator Repression Resource Deprivation 
Strikes: Companies Termination; Suspensions; 
Intimidation/threats; 
Increased plant security 
measures; “Moral” appeals 
to workers 
Terminations; Suspensions 
             UAW Lack of representation; 
Attempts to subsume into 
more moderate movements 
Lack of representation 
             Police Use of riot gear; Dispersing 
picket lines; Cease and 
desist notices; Increased 
patrol 
N/A 
Protests: Companies Terminations; Suspensions Terminations; Suspensions 
               UAW Preventing union 
membership votes; Denial 
of benefits; Refusal of 
representation; Avoidance 
of confrontation 
Denial of benefits; Refusal 
of representation 
               Police N/A N/A 
Elections: Companies N/A N/A 
                 UAW Encouraging (racist) retired 
workers to vote; Making 
false claims about RUM 
candidates; UAW 
International letter 
condemning “separatists”; 
Malfunctioning voting 
machines; Blatant election 
rule breaking; Voter 
disqualification 
Loss of access to financial 
resources; Loss of influence 
over union resources; Loss 
of organizational 
recognitions (human 
resources); Loss of access 
to “legitimized power” 
                 Police Ticketing RUM supporters; 
Beating RUM supporters; 
Intimidation; Stalling; 
Arrests; Armed occupation 
N/A 
State: Surveillance Police surveillance of 
General Baker, events 
attended and actions 
N/A 
          Trials Arrests and charges leading 
to legal trials 
Monopolizing time of 
human resources otherwise 
available for organizing; 
Legal fees 
          South End N/A Manipulation of resource 
allocation toward more 
moderate coverage 
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Chapter Five 
 
League Ideology and Factionalization 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Our historical tracing suggests that the League and its components, while never a 
completely ideologically or tactically coherent group, organized flexibly and effectively 
when proceeding from a material base.  However, when heavy repression diminished its 
influence in the plant, ideological differences became more nettlesome.  Furthermore, 
continued resource scarcity pressured the League to consider tactical changes that weren’t 
popular amongst all elements of the League.   
 In this chapter I will examine ideology and factionalization as secondary factors in 
the League’s demobilization.  In “League Ideology” I will discuss the distinct ideologies of 
the RUMs and the revolutionary newspaper and how, despite certain differences, they came 
together to become the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.  In “League Split” I 
examine three documents and a retrospective interview by ex-League members discussing 
what they interpreted as the crucial issues leading to the split in the League.  Finally, in 
“Factionalization”, I will show how ideological and tactical schisms led to internal strains 
which ultimately spelled doom for an already struggling League. 
 
2. LEAGUE IDEOLOGY 
 The Revolutionary Union Movements and the radical newspaper arose from different 
experiences, held different positions relative to the means of production, and contributed 
different ideological viewpoints to the League, each of which is worth exploring 
independently.  DRUM,  the original RUM and model for the others, laid out its ideology 
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most clearly in its Constitution, and fourteen-demand program.  The revolutionary 
newspapers, whether they be The Inner City Voice, The South End, or Spear, most clearly 
expressed their ideological orientation in interviews given by John Watson, the editor of 
each.  Crossover in terms of staff and objectives pushed the two constituent elements of the 
League into a degree of ideologically consonance.  The groups’ common ideological 
expression can be found in the League’s General Program and Labor Program.” Although 
this statement was more detailed and explicit than DRUM’s fourteen-demand program or 
Watson’s interviews, it does not represent a significant ideological shift for either of the 
elements represented in the merger. 
The RUMs represented the element of the League more influenced by Black 
Nationalism, and they drew very important links between their struggle for liberation within 
the United States and struggles for national liberation across the globe, particularly in 
Vietnam.  The first sentence of DRUM’s Constitution reveals the vitality of such a 
connection: 
We the super-exploited black workers recognize the historic role that we must 
play and the grave responsibility that is ours in the struggle for the liberation 
of black people in racist U.S.A and people of color around the world from the 
yoke of oppression that holds all of us in the chains of slavery to this 
country’s racist exploitative system. 
 
They maintain that because of the important position in production held by Black workers as 
colonized people within the imperialist hegemon, “only a struggle led by black workers can 
triumph our powerful reactionary enemy”, essentially claiming that Black workers are the 
revolutionary vanguard whose success in thwarting racism in the United States is the 
precondition for other successful struggles.  Furthermore, DRUM and other RUMs were by 
no means ignorant of capitalist exploitation’s effects on all workers, even relatively 
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privileged white workers.  However, they insist that movements often fail because they are 
“betrayed from within” which in the case of racially integrated movements are dismantled 
“by the white leadership exploiting the racist nature of the white workers they led”.  They 
therefore conclude that for the sake of the movement’s strategic integrity, “membership is 
denied to all honkies due to the fact that said honkey has been the historic enemy, betrayer, 
and exploiter of black people”.  Yet, they do allow for relationships with white workers “on 
the basis of coalition over issues”, meaning that in the case of mutual concerns, RUMS could 
enter into coalition with radicalized white workers.1 
 DRUM’s Program, a list of fourteen broad-ranging political demands made to the 
UAW, is oriented to material results and not tightly tied to Black Nationalism rather than 
Marxism.  Summarized, they are: 1) “Halt U.A.W. racism” by increasing Black 
representation in the U.A.W. including electing a Black U.A.W president. 2) Revising the 
grievance procedure to solve grievances immediately by workers at the plant involved. 
3)”Elimination of all safety and health hazards in the auto industry”.  4) Fighting against 
speed ups and increases in production standards 5) Fighting for a five hour workday and a 
four day workweek. 6) An immediate doubling of wages for production workers based on the 
rapid increase in productivity of workers without comparable pay increases. 7) A cut in union 
dues, to limit wastefulness of incompetent union executives. 8) “The end of the checkoff of 
union dues”. 9) “All UAW investment funds be used to finance economic development in the 
black community under programs of self determination”. 10) “We demand that the union end 
its collusion with the United Foundation”. 11) UAW political campaign money be turned 
over to the Black United Front, “for Black controlled and directed political work”. 12) “We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 DRUM, “Constitution”, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 18, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State 
University. 
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demand that the U.A.W. end its collusion with the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and all other white racist 
spy institutions.”  13) “We demand that the U.A.W. end all interference in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the black community”.  14) That the UAW use its 
political and strike powers to demand a) An end the Vietnam War. b) “An end to all taxes 
imposed upon workers”. c) “Increases in profit and property taxes to make up the 
difference”. d) “Reallocation of all Federal monies spent on defense to meet the pressing 
needs of the black and poor populations of America”.2   
 The DRUM program objects to racism, unsafe working conditions, exploitation (via 
long hours and under-compensation), union executive elitism and bureaucracy, collusion 
with the powers that be, and war.  It draws concrete connections between race exploitation, 
labor oppression, poverty, and imperialism.  It does, however, omit discussion of sexism, 
particularly the specific oppression endured by Black women workers.  Furthermore, it 
avoids heavily Marxist terminology other than “exploitation” and “means of production”. 
 The crew working on The Inner City Voice (and later The South End) was much 
smaller than the mass movements being built by workers (and ex-workers) in the RUMs.  It 
was also more heavily dominated by students (albeit mostly children of factory workers) who 
were temporarily exempt from the necessity of selling their labor to the owners of the means 
of production.  Three of the original writers and editors of The Inner City Voice who would 
go onto be on the first Central Committee of the League - General Baker, Michael Hamlin, 
and John Watson - dictated the ideological leanings of the radical newspapers they produced.  
Two interviews with John Watson most closely demonstrate the newspapers’ ideology. 
Following V.I. Lenin who claimed: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Program, “DRUM’s Program”, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 1, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne 
State University 
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In our opinion… the main thread which, if followed, would enable us steadily 
to develop, deepen, and extend that organization, should be the founding of an 
All-Russian political newspaper… [W]ithout it we cannot conduct the 
systematic, all-round propaganda and agitation, consistent in principle, which 
is the chief and permanent task of Social-Democracy in general and, in 
particular, the pressing task of the moment, when interest in politics and in 
questions of socialism has been aroused among the broadest strata.3 
 
John Watson explained that the newspapers’ editors wanted to build “a Black Bolshevik 
Party” and so produced a regular newspaper to “bridge between the peaks of activity,” 
organize “the division of labor among Black revolutionaries and” create “a network 
throughout the community”.4  It was as important to Watson that the newspaper be an all-
Black working class political newspaper, as it was to Lenin that the newspaper be an “all-
Russian political newspaper”.  However, these newspapers were slightly more nuanced than 
their RUM counterparts in their adoption of Black Nationalist rhetoric. Watson stated that 
“Black nationalism in and of itself represents a broad political spectrum from left to right.  
There are Black Nationalists who are essentially Black fascists, and you have other Black 
Nationalists who are essentially Black Marxist-Leninist Communist revolutionaries”.  He 
made it clear throughout the interview that his newspapers were not reactionary but rather 
ideologically Black Marxist-Leninist.5 
 A few notes are needed before I move on to how the fully formed ideology of the 
League negotiated the ideological convergences and divergences of DRUM and the 
newspapers. DRUM took a harder nationalistic line, leaving it a little more flexibility when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lenin, V.I., “Where to Begin?,” In Lenin Collected Works, vol. 5, (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1961), 13-24. 
4 Interview, “Interview with John Watson”, Radical America, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, 
Northwestern University Library. 
5 Interview, “To the Point of Production- An Interview with John Watson of the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers”, July 1969, Bx 4, Fd 22, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, 
Wayne State University. 
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appealing to workers around on the basis of immediate economic concerns rather than a 
consistent theory of exploitation.  It also used harsher racialized language such as “honkey” 
and “Polak” that off put some older and otherwise sympathetic workers.  On the other hand, 
the newspapers were less likely to use harsh nationalist rhetoric, opting for a more Marxist 
rhetoric that came off to some as elitist or irrelevant.  However, both groups agreed that the 
strength of Black workers and their community existed at the point of production. 
 The League of Revolutionary Black Workers devised a more complete and thorough 
philosophical and ideological position than did its predecessors, but one can find 
contributions from each group in the formulation of the League’s General Program, which 
states, “The League of Revolutionary Black Workers is dedicated to waging a relentless 
struggle against racism, capitalism, and imperialism”.  The Program emphasizes the vital 
connection of racism, both in the U.S. and abroad, to capitalism (as “essentially a black 
working class”) and imperialism (“imperialist oppression and exploitation of the world 
creates a privileged status for the people and workers of the U.S.”)  For the League, “these 
two systems of privilege … become the basis for the aristocracy of white labor” giving 
“white labor a huge stake in the imperialist system” rendering “white labor unable and unfit 
to lead the working class in the U.S.”.  Furthermore, “[r]acism has been effectively used time 
and time again to prevent a unified colorless proletariat from carrying on a protracted 
revolutionary struggle against capitalism and imperialism.”  Therefore, although the League 
ideologically recognizes a common class position of Black and white workers, they argue 
that in their specific conditions only the Black working class is fit to lead a revolutionary 
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party.  This is what the League means when they call themselves a “Black Marxist-Leninist 
party”.6 
 Unlike its predecessors, the League took an explicit stance against the sexism 
perpetrated upon Black women.  They recognized that “Black women at large have been 
viciously discriminated against in the labor market… Black women are a significant section 
of the reserve labor force”.  Black women workers were less likely to be in union shops, and 
suffered heavily from sexual harassment.  She was less likely than her white counterpart to 
be in white-collar clerical or secretarial work.  The League set some goals for addressing the 
intersection of sexism and racism in the plants, including demands for “child care, health 
facilities, [and] educational facilities for children and parents.”  Despite this, the League was 
heavily paternalistic, calling many women brainwashed by the “middle class ideal,” charging 
that they “ha[ve] not learned how to struggle to change [their situation].”7  In a retrospective 
interview, Edna Ewell Watson (wife of John Watson) states: 
 
The role of women in the League was traditionalist in terms of black 
patriarchal ideology and political priorities.  Women were positioned and 
constructed to be supportive of male leadership… Monogamy for females in 
dyads was assumed to be a value and much the norm, if not required.  But 
womanizing among the males was acceptable.  Women who wanted to be 
sexually expressive or experimental were labeled as ‘loose,’ ‘easy,’ or 
‘whorish,’.  Many of the male leaders acted as if women were sexual 
commodities, mindless, emotionally unstable, or invisible…  There was no 
lack of roles for women in the League as long as they accepted subordination 
and invisibility.  Homophobia, of course, was rampant.8 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The General Policy Statement and Labor Program of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers, n.d. Bx 1, Fd 86, ALEC, Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 224-25. 
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 Still, the League maintained the centrality of organizing at the point of production, 
and combating UAW practices that sustained racism in the plants.  They emphasized the 
importance of building a Labor Strike and Defense Fund specifically for Black workers.  
Simultaneously, Black workers “must be educated and prepared ahead of time to the nature 
and purpose of specific strikes”.  One way of doing this was to distribute publications in each 
of the plants (such as the DRUM, FRUM, and ELRUM newsletters, as well as The Spear).  
While the League recognized the importance of Black workers who were members of the 
surplus labor army, they insisted that it was workers in the plants who had the power to 
combat capitalism and effect real change.  This is why they called for Black workers at the 
point of production to be the “revolutionary vanguard”.9 
 
3. LEAGUE SPLIT 
 A major split in the League occurred on June 12, 1971 when three members of the 
seven-member Central Committee – Ken Cockrel, Mike Hamlin, and John Watson – joined 
James Forman in leaving the League to concentrate their efforts on the Black Worker’s 
Congress. Three surviving documents address the split’s central issues, including ideology, 
tactics, and personality.  The first document was written by the splitters.  The second was 
written by John Williams (member of the original Central Committee), Rufus Burke and 
Clint Marbury (long time central staff of the League).  A third document was written by 
Marian Kramer, a long time member of the central staff of the League as well as the first 
woman to be elected to the Central Committee of the League (after the split occurred). 
Kramer’s contemporaneous account is supplemented  with a 2016 retrospective interview 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The General Policy Statement and Labor Program of the League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers, n.d. Bx 1, Fd 86, ALEC, Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh. 
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conducted by the League of Revolutionary Black Workers Media Project.  I will address each 
in turn. 
 Ken Cockrel, Mike Hamlin, and John Watson’s document, The Split in the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers: Three Lines and Three Headquarters, described the “internal 
contradictions” as ideological and class related.  More specifically the authors claimed that 
an “incessant struggle over the questions of ideology, policy, programs, strategy, and tactics” 
was occurring, with League leadership and base split into three definitive tendencies and 
factions.  They called their faction and Forman’s, “proletarian revolutionaries … socialist 
political leaders and workers in the struggle to build socialism and hasten the defeat of 
imperialism in the world”.  They claimed that the second faction, “the petty bourgeois 
opportunists,” flaunted their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and “practiced revolution in a 
way that showed their disdain for not only the working class but every other stratum of the 
population that did not instantly recognize their ‘superior theoretical virtues’” and 
revolutionary leadership.  The third faction, “the backward reactionary-nationalist lumpen-
proletariat”, they described as those “whose view of revolutionary struggle was one of 
equating such struggle to a popularity contest, in which judges were the most reactionary, 
least conscious sections of the population”.10   
 There was a clear tactical difference between the so-called “proletarian 
revolutionaries” and the other two factions.  The splitters argued that the League needed to 
extend its organizing reach beyond the plant into the community.  As such “the role of the 
other two tendencies in [community activities] ran from negligible to non-existent with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Essay, John Watson, Michael Hamlin, and Kenneth Cockrel, “The Split in the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers: Three Lines and Three Headquarters”, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 19, 
DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, 1-8. 
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latter describing the petty-bourgeois opportunist wing precisely.”  Community oriented 
activities that the League participated in included judicial defense of Black workers, 
newspaper and media production, participation in the Black Economic Development 
Conference, and the Control, Conflict, and Change Book Club.  These tactical issues brought 
up issues of resource scarcity and allocation, thus resource deprivation exacerbated “internal” 
conflicts.11 
 The second major issue discussed in this document is Black Nationalism and the 
League’s relationship to white workers.  The “proletarian revolutionaries” maintained their 
willingness “to engage in practice with whites whose revolutionary dedication and 
acceptance of the concept of the black vanguard” was unquestioned.  They claimed that their 
“principled relations” with radical white organizations such as the Motor City Labor League 
and the Labor Defense Coalition “aided our advance materially and causes us to feel that to 
reject struggle on that front is tragically incorrect.”  Furthermore, they charge that the 
“reactionary nationalist” section undermined the organization with use of “shrill cries” such 
as “honkies” and “devils”.  What is more, they assert that “reactionary nationalism, which 
precedes the history of the League, is a history of bankrupt politics and policies, laced with 
such idealistic perversities as astrology, mysticism, infantile militarism and adventurism,” 
and was never explicitly accepted by the general membership of the organization. 
 One last point made in this document must be briefly examined.  The so-called 
“proletarian revolutionaries” clearly sided with James Forman, who they claimed was “hated 
throughout this country by petite-bourgeois intellectuals” and “revolutionary nationalists”.  
They credited him with contributions to the League that were “substantial and there for all to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 9-17. 
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see,” while the other two factions opposed his pragmatic efforts to develop resources, raise 
funds, and perform other bureaucratic tasks functionally necessary for the existence of a 
mobilized organization.  It seems clear that James Forman was, if nothing else, a divisive 
figure.12  
 In response to this pamphlet’s “organizational criticism”, John Williams, Rufus 
Burke, and Clint Marbury submitted a document titled Rationale for the Revolutionary 
Leadership (Dictatorship of the Proletariat).  They claimed that, in fact, the splitters were 
“petty-bourgeois renegades” unable to accept the dictatorship of the proletariat and insisted 
that the splitters “displayed utter contempt and disdain towards the workers in the 
organization”.  This disdain was visible in three ways: 
1) The subordination of the workers interest (supposedly the interest of the 
organization) to those of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e. globe-trotting in the name 
of internationalism while our base areas were crumbling- very adventuristic; 
out right lying to the masses claiming that we were capable of closing down 
“ten plants at a minutes notice”; and more adventurism which manifested by 
trying to create a national organization without a workers base. 2) Refusal to 
do any type of hard physical labor whatsoever and integrate themselves with 
the workers not only in words but also in deeds. For, the criterion for truth is 
not idle jiberous or childish twaddle but social practice and social practice 
alone. 3) Refusal to do “mundane” tasks and involve themselves in the 
practical movement, i.e. distribution of literature at plants and selling of our 
official organ or anything beyond pushing a pencil and talking “shit”.  In 
essence point number 10 of Combat Liberalism which reads “To regard 
oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution, to pride oneself on 
being a veteran, to disdain minor assignments while being quite unequal to 
major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study.” 
 
Essentially they were accusing the splitters of internationalism (Cockrel and Watson 
certainly were the League members traveling abroad most), elitism, and intellectualism.  The 
stance seems founded on two Mao Zedong essays: “Some Questions Concerning Methods of 
Leadership” and “Combat Liberalism”.  As an organizational solution, the League’s 	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leadership was altered to more accurately reflect the dictatorship of the proletariat by electing 
more workers to the Central Committee of the reorganized League (only General Baker and 
Chuck Wooten remained from the original Central Committee).13 
A second response, On Splits, was written by Marian Kramer,14 who believed that the 
organizational split could be traced to political, structural, and tactical controversies. She 
stated, “it is our belief that the political differences between ourselves and the splitters 
revolve around a lack of clarity on the National Question”.15  In a recent retrospective 
interview, Marian Kramer again commented on the split: 
 
The split was a good thing for us, because it made us understand that we 
needed our education to go to the next level.  We had just about won every 
reform in the factory that had to be won, and in the school system and health 
care, a lot of things, you know?  But, so therefore that split had to move, 
because we needed a new direction, and I hate the fact that a lot of these folks 
[the splitters], felt that they had to take credit for what they didn’t do. 
 
 
The last sentence seems to refer to the splitters’ claims that they did far more revolutionary 
work than did the “other two factions”.  She used an anecdote to illustrate the splitters’ 
elitism.  Several women from the League were attending a women workers’ conference in 
Toronto, where they had been asked to speak and represent the League.  Members of a gay 
coalition from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia approached them about a taking a trip to 
Vietnam to speak.  The spokeswomen from the League replied that they would think about it.  
However, before any of the women saw the letter containing the official invitation, James 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Essay, John Williams, Rufus Burke, and Clint Marbury, “Rationale for Revolutionary 
Leadership (Dictatorship of the Proletariat)”, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 25, DRMR, Walter P. Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University, 1-4. 
14 Unfortunately, a page of the document that may have contained useful information was 
missing from the microfilm. 
15 Transcript, Marian Kramer, On Splits, BPM4 Reel 1/3, Microfilm, Northwestern 
University Library. 
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Forman, Ken Cockrel, and John Watson flew off to Vietnam to represent the League in place 
of the women’s delegation.16 
 
4. FACTIONALIZATION 
 Up to this point in this chapter I have examined the ideological makeup of the League 
of Revolutionary Black Workers as well League members’ analyses of the split (and practical 
demobilization) of this social movement organization.  These two explorations situate us to 
consider what Christian Davenport calls “internal influences” of demobilization.  While 
Davenport considers five - burnout, factionalization, lost commitment, membership loss, and 
rigidity - I will examine one that is the most pertinent to the League’s, factionalization.  For 
Davenport factionalization occurs when “dissident members… hit a point beyond which they 
refuse to go-at least collectively”.  This point can be ideological, “a difference of opinion 
regarding objectives being pursued (revolution or reform)” or “the tactics employed to get 
there (violence or nonviolence)”.  In the League’s case we see both ideological (Black 
Nationalism and [Black] Marxism) strain and tactical (plant organizing and plant/community 
organizing) strain.  A third and final internal demobilizing influence does not fit cleanly into 
one of Davenport’s five categories.  James Forman’s entrance to and involvement in the 
League, subordinate to his self-promotion, drastically interrupted its organizing.  I will 
discuss each factor in turn: ideological factionalization, tactical factionalization, and the 
“James Forman effect”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Marian Kramer, “On the Split and Critical Thinking”, League of Revolutionary Black 
Workers: A Media Project with the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, accessed May 
13, 2016, https://www.revolutionaryblackworkers.org/video/. 
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The League’s ideological split, with (roughly) Black Nationalist RUMs on one side 
and Black Marxist newspapers and students on the other, poses the theoretical question of 
how and to what degree class is intertwined with racism. Both factions the splitters and those 
who remained in the League, accepted some level of class analysis as well as some level of 
nationalism in their analysis of race in the auto industry and the UAW. There is no evidence 
to suggest that “Black Capitalism” or “right-wing Nationalism” was a part of this ideological 
dispute, but the conflicting Black Nationalist and Marxist interpretations of the intersection 
of race and class found in the introduction (pages 4-9) played out in the League split. 
 The splitters unequivocally argued that Marx(ism) was centrally relevant to the Black 
worker’s struggle. Like Allen, the splitters subordinated race to class, believing that the 
continued racist sentiment of white workers and union leadership stood in the way of a 
unified, racially solidaristic, worldwide proletariat.  That racism persisted because white 
labor maintained an interest in its relative advantage over other workers.  But, for the 
splitters, it was necessary to maintain proletarian consciousness even while combatting the 
racism of fellow workers.  While those remaining in the League did not repudiate the 
importance of class, but they saw classical Marxism (in its fundamental form) as much less 
relevant and pertinent. Radicals who had engaged in real, long-term struggle, such as Mao 
Zedong, and Toussaint Louverture, interested those who remained in the League more than 
those devoted to intellectually elaborating the Marxist legacy.  Furthermore, there was a 
feeling that Marx and his white academic followers were theoretically bankrupt when it came 
to racial oppression and Black Power.  This is pithily represented a phrase some League 
members used, “Marx was a honkie”.17  Some of these League members may have been 
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influenced by their reading of Harold Cruse, who called for Blacks to disassociate themselves 
from the white left, particularly the Communist Party. 
 Still, one can’t help but notice a large residual ideological common ground between 
both factions.  Both groups still believed that the Black working class was the vanguard of 
struggle and could not risk tying itself too closely to white movements.  Both factions sought 
greater worker control over the League.  However, as the splitters insisted, “the League’s 
internal contradictions… class and ideological … had been the source of intensive struggle 
throughout the organization’s history”.18  Why, then, did it take so long for these 
contradictions to come to a head?  This is because mass mobilized movement always entails 
ideological contradictions.  Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, The Civil Rights 
Movement (in its various forms), and the LGBTQ movements all had/have ideological 
contradictions.  Movements mobilize within these contradictions, not outside of them.  
Therefore, one cannot imagine a movement free of ideological contradictions. When 
movements are able to make tangible progress toward common goals, ideological 
contradictions are of little concern. 
 Tactical and strategic differences became more and more prominent as the League 
moved towards the split.  Under the condition of scarce resources and declining influence in 
the plants, the future splitters moved their focus outside the plant to community organizing.  
Much of the money brought in by the BEDC was spent in this way, including defense of 
“blacks charged with ludicrous ‘crimes’” such as the New Bethel case and the James Johnson 
case, and media production via Black Star Printing, Black Star Publishing, and Black Star 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Essay, John Watson, Michael Hamlin, and Kenneth Cockrel, The Split in the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers: Three Lines and Three Headquarters, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 19, 
DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, 1-2. 
	  	  
108 
Productions.  John Watson even spent time in Europe attempting to disseminate the film 
Finally Got the News (with moderate success), justifying, for many, charges of 
internationalism.  Time and resources were spent in a movement to give Detroit’s Black 
communities control over their public schools.  Perhaps most controversially, the group 
sponsored a Control, Conflict and Change Book Club whose participants were 98 percent 
white and primarily middle class.  The splitters justified this move by claiming that: 
 
This program serves a two-fold purpose; one, the development of an 
organizational structure of whites committed to increasing their understanding 
of Marxism-Leninism so as to function as discussion leaders and staff for the 
book club, and two, the establishment of a forum wherein less highly 
developed whites can make contact with Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and 
their programs free of the condescension so often characteristic of such 
meetings between “revolutionaries” and the people.19 
 
 
Others such as General Baker were against spending resources outside of the plant as they 
believed the League’s base among workers was too small to justify expanding into non-
worker-based organizing. 
 In a similar vein, the two factions clashed over joining the Black Workers Congress.  
The Black Workers Congress was originally meant to be a nationwide Marxist-Leninist 
union for Black workers, and the League was to be one of its main components.20  But many 
in the League believed the worker base to be too small to justify a venture into national and 
international territory.  For plant-minded leadership like Chuck Wooten and General Baker, 
time and resources would be better spent locally, in Detroit, building up the small base of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Essay, John Watson, Michael Hamlin, and Kenneth Cockrel, The Split in the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers: Three Lines and Three Headquarters, n.d., Bx 1, Fd 19, 
DRMR, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, 9-17. 
20 Black Workers Congress, The Struggle against Revisionism and opportunism: Against the 
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workers that they had already organized.  They saw the BWC as “bureaucratic”, 
“adventuristic” and “bourgeois”.  Subsequent to the split, the League was expelled from the 
BWC. 
 Finally, James Forman’s role in the demobilization of the League must be considered, 
as detailed in Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin’s poignant analysis.  James Forman 
originally came into contact with the League during the BEDC that he was instrumental in 
organizing.  With his hefty resume of organizational experience, bolstered by the resources 
he garnered from the conference, he soon became a member of the League’s Central.  He 
simultaneously began to organize the Black Workers Congress.  However, Forman’s 
program for the BWC ran in stark opposition to the League leadership. “Forman viewed the 
League as subordinate to BWC, a position in sharp contrast to the League belief that BWC 
would be a creature of the League.”21  He was able to attract Cockrel, Hamlin, and Watson to 
this project, then expelled the League from the BWC.  Forman was criticized by remaining 
League members for “excessive personalism”, “theoretical simplification”, “incompetence”, 
“egoism”, “opportunism”, and “international adventurism”. Forman not only structured the 
BWC hierarchically, he attempted to foster a cult of personality built around his own 
theoretical perspective, “Formanism”. 
 
In effect, Formanism substituted ideological struggle for struggle over 
material conditions.  The focus had to remain ideological because people were 
recruited into study groups and organizing commissions rather than action 
groups prepared to deal with immediate issues.  Reduced to study groups and 
organizing commissions, politics was effectively separated from the problems 
of work and daily life. The education itself was anticolonial, anti-racist, and 
anti-imperialist, but ideas were not presented in the context of a serious class 
analysis of the roles black play in America or of the state of mid-twentieth-
century capitalism.  Unlike the economically grounded and disciplined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 136.	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organizational approach of Marxism-Leninism, the approach of Fanon-
Formanism was exemplified by loosely structured groups stressing 
psychological interpretations of social reality and accumulation of technical 
skills.  Formanism was less a program for moving toward power than a 
defensive tactic for dealing with oppression.22 
 
 
In this way, Formanism went against the League’s pragmatic, materialistic approach.  While 
Forman successfully wooed three important leaders from the League, the BWC never gained 
footing and soon folded.  Each of these three previous leaders would eventually turn his back 
on Forman.  In early 1972 Ken Cockrel openly criticized Forman, calling his reports “vague, 
programless, and individualistic” and his person “an American Airlines revolutionary … 
more interested in personal power than in the organization’s welfare”. As a result, Cockrel 
was subjected to investigation by a BWC commission, inspiring a number of important 
resignations from the BWC, including that of John Watson.  Hamlin continued on as the 
BWC’s national chairman, but by April 1973 he acted to expel Forman from the BWC.  In a 
paper describing his rationale, Hamlin described Forman as “secretive, paranoid, furtive, and 
individualistic to the bone,” concluding “ JAMES FORMAN OPPORTUNITICALLY 
DESTROYED THE LEAGUE, DOING THE WORK OF THE BOURGEOISIE”.23 
*** 
 This chapter has focused on the internal contention that broke into the open as the 
League demobilized.  It first examined the ideological perspectives first developed by the 
RUMs and radical newspapers, then collaboratively by the League.  This process brought 
together the left-leaning Black Nationalism espoused by the RUMs and the Black Marxism-
Leninism espoused by the radical newspapers. Second, it reviews the split in the League 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 139.	  
23 Georgakas and Surkin, Detroit: I Do Mind Dying, 136-149. 
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through commentary by League members on its origins.  Each member’s commentary calls 
attention to to ideological, tactical, and personal contention and strain within the 
organization, as well as the special, difficult to categorize role played by James.  The final 
section on factionalization explored the League’s ideological juxtaposition of the national 
question and Marxism, as well as its tactical differences over issues of organizing (plant vs. 
community and local vs. national).  The chapter shows that factionalization seems to have 
doomed an already weakened movement in three ways: via ideological strain, primarily over 
the national question, and a different interpretation of the relevance of the class component to 
the movement; through tactical and strategic differences pitting community against plant and 
national against local organizing; and finally, by way of a nationally recognized yet 
polarizing and self-serving figure, James Forman. Forman exacerbated both ideological and 
tactical internal strain. In the concluding chapter, however, I will contend that these internal 
strains did not become pressing until the auto companies, the state, and he union had crippled 
both the League and the larger movement of militant Black workers that it represented.
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Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has examined some of the basic principles of Christian Davenport’s 
theoretical framework which suggests that social movements “die” because they are “kill[ed]  
… from the outside and the inside,”1 using a “most similar” case study to Davenport’s study 
of the Republic of New Africa.  While the League had different goals, used different tactics, 
and faced (some) different challengers than did the RNA, they both fit firmly into the Black 
Power movement occurring in the wake of moderate civil rights reform during the late 60s 
and early 70s.  Organizing in and around Detroit at the same time, their histories coincide and 
overlap, most notably in the New Bethel Incident.  I contend that, while both internal and 
external factors played a role in demobilizing the League, it would be a mistake to allot equal 
weight to each.  I show this through historical tracing which reveals that, despite ideological 
and tactical differences among members of the League and its precursor organizations, it 
wasn’t until repressive action and resource deprivation by auto companies, the UAW, and the 
state greatly restricted League influence within plant and union that factionalization caused 
the League to split and then quickly die.  I place special emphasis on the role of the UAW in 
this process because it is a type of organization not anticipated in Davenport’s framework, 
one which claims to act on behalf or in favor of a constituency while repressing and denying 
resources to rival organizations seeking support from the same constituency. 
The chapter “Condition of Black Automobile Workers 1919-1968” explored the 
material conditions that led up to the formation of the League.  An influx of Black labor, 
fleeing oppression and poverty in the south, searching for the gains available through waged 
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  Christian Davenport, How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the 
Republic of New Africa, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 38.	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labor in the north, opened up a new source of labor previously untapped by northern 
capitalists.  Henry Ford eagerly exploited this new labor force, hiring more Black workers 
than any other employer and developing a set of paternalistic relationships he with Black 
political and religious leaders in Detroit.  Black workers across the auto industry held the 
most hazardous and undesirable jobs in the plant, but were skeptical of unions which 
opportunistically courted Black support while harboring a largely racist white rank and file. 
During this time period it was common to use Black workers as strike-breakers.  A final 
showdown between the UAW and Ford in 1941 highlighted the importance of Black workers 
to the unionization movement.  Black political and religious leaders along with the workers 
were split on the issue, as Ford had hired more Black workers than any other company in the 
auto industry, but Black workers could stand to gain materially if Ford unionized.  Eventually 
the UAW was able to win over support of most Black workers, political, and religious 
leaders by embracing, at least in words, racial egalitarianism.  This ushered in a two-and-a-
half decade alliance between Black labor and the UAW.  My analysis of this time period, 
however, shows that the UAW did not make good on its promises, and by the late 1960s 
Black workers still had less job security, worse pay at less-skilled jobs, and more dangerous 
jobs than white workers. Their absolute employment gains that did not keep pace with Black 
population growth in the Detroit region, and their influence within the union was small.  
Broken promises and lack of material improvement led to Black workers’ growing 
dissatisfaction with the UAW. 
The chapter “Revolutionary Union Movements and Radical Newspapers” explores 
two responses to growing discontent to these conditions as well as persistent racism in and 
around Detroit.  Although, the movements had not yet formally come into existence, the 
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close ties between the leadership of the RUMs and the editorship of the radical newspapers 
allows us to view 1968 as the year that the League took shape.  The first revolutionary 
newspaper that included John Watson (editor-in-chief), Mike Hamlin and General Baker as a 
part of the editorial team was the Inner-City Voice.  Inspired by V.I. Lenin’s essay Where to 
Begin, they decided to create an all-Black Marxist-Leninist political newspaper to cover the 
turbulent political landscape locally, nationally, and internationally.  In May of 1968 the first 
Revolutionary Union Movement, DRUM, was formed and went on to do battle with Dodge 
Main via wildcat strike, and the UAW via local election.  Other RUMs quickly sprung up 
including ELRUM, FRUM, JARUM, FORUM, HARUM, MARUM, and UPRUM.  They 
demanded equal treatment of Black workers in hiring and promotion, improved safety 
conditions, and increased representation within the UAW.  They viewed Black industrial 
workers as the vanguard of revolutionary struggle. 
“Chronology of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers” covered the unification 
of the RUMs and the revolutionary newspapers into the League in March 1969 traced the 
major events during the League’s relatively short life.  The League functioned as a 
democratic centralist organization composed of various RUMs and student groups under the 
direction of a seven-man central committee, selected from the RUMs and the radical 
newspapers. The League produced a policy and program statement espousing what they 
called “Black Marxism-Leninism,” and organized and participated in strikes, union local 
elections, union protests, legal defense trials, conferences, media production, and political 
education.   
The next chapter, “Analysis of External Demobilization Factors: Repression and 
Resource Deprivation,” analyzed external pressures put on the League by the companies, the 
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UAW, and the state.  Each used distinct modes of repression and resource deprivations.  The 
companies used termination, suspension, intimidation, increased plant security, and moral 
appeals to workers. The UAW used lack of representation, cooptation, avoidance, lies, 
manipulation, outright cheating, and denial of access to “legitimized power”.  The state used 
violence and intimidation, legal harassment, citations, surveillance, and manipulation of 
resources.  The UAW was far of supportive of RUM-affiliated workers when they filed 
grievances, and actively mobilized against RUMs in union local elections.  Hence the 
companies were able, with the UAW’s tacit support, to successfully terminate the most 
radical and active members of the League while silencing sympathizers through acts of 
intimidations.  Furthermore, by stymying attempts to gain access to “legitimized power” in 
the union locals, the union limited resources that the League could have been used to further 
its cause.  The chapter concludes that external factors serve as the primary engine of 
demobilization of the League. 
In “League Ideology and Factionalization” I explored a secondary factor in the 
demobilization of the League, internal strain.  This came from ideological factionalization 
centered around the national question and the immediate relevance of Marxism (or class-
focused theory more generally) to the Black workers’ liberation, tactical factionalization 
around issues of national versus local organization and plant versus community action, and 
finally the polarizing personality of James Forman which likely accentuated the ideological 
and tactical issues. 
The novel aspect of Davenport’s theory of social movement (de)mobilization is his 
examination of how internal and external demobilizing factors intersect and interact.  The 
two that have concerned us most here are the intersections of resource deprivation and 
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factionalization (intersection 1 in Davenport’s schema) and repression and factionalization 
(Davenport’s intersection 11).  Davenport says of the first, “situations may exist where 
resource deprivations… take place at the same time as a faction develops within a dissident 
organization… for example, a faction may form around the issue of resource deprivation and 
[what?] should be done about it”.2  In this case study, intersection 1 entailed resource 
deprivation from the company through terminations and suspensions, and from the UAW 
through electoral blockades and corruption limited financial and human resources along with 
access to “legitimized power,” causing a tactical shift to national (and community?) 
organizing, leading to a factionalization. 
Davenport describes intersection 11 this way: “it is common in the aftermath of 
repressive action for SMOs to factionalize with regard to how the movement organization 
should respond to state action”.3  The League, however, did not experience repression just 
from, or even primarily from, the state. Company terminations and suspensions reinforced by 
UAW lack of representation, combined with UAW electoral corruption, both supported by 
police intimidation tactics, led to greatly diminished League influence in the plants and union 
locals, causing stagnation within the movement.  With diminishing ability to secure material 
gains, the League turned to a heightened degree of ideological self-scrutiny, leading to 
factionalization. 
Close process tracing shows that external factors preceded and helped cause the 
internal factors that were the proximate causes of the split in the League. This contrasts with 
Geschwender’s conclusion in Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency: The League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers that, “The League might have been able to survive its external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Davenport, How Social Movements Die, 39. 
3 Ibid., 40. 
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enemies if it had been internally sound. It is doubtful if it could have survived its internal 
contradictions even in the absence of external enemies.”4  The most serious and aggressive 
contention at the plant level occurred shortly after the RUMs’ founding and before the 
League was created.  After the May 2, 1968 strike, two of the most radicalized workers in the 
plant were permanently fired while three were fired/rehired. A larger purge occurred at the 
Eldon Avenue Plant in the wake of ELRUM’s January 1969 UAW demonstration and 
subsequent wildcat. Two workers, including ELRUM’s president, were permanently fired 
while 23-27 were fired/rehired and 40-60 more suspended.  The length of time between 
termination and rehire varied from a handful of days to a few months and was not usually 
accompanied with back pay.  Soon after the League formed soon in March of 1969 one of its 
RUM affiliates lost a second close local election, followed by UAW repression and resource 
deprivation. In late April, the League attended the BEDC, securing fiscal resources and 
recruiting James Forman to the organization.  This search for new resources in the wake of 
earlier repression and resource deprivation foreshadowed a rise in bureaucracy, a polarization 
of the League’s historical leadership around a new central figure, and a partial and gradual 
tactical shift from plant to community that would have been less necessary had influence in 
the plants and union not already been diminished. In last ditch efforts to overcome the 
hostility of companies, union and state, ELRUM attempted a string of three wildcat strikes in 
from mid April to early May of 1970 and DRUM attempted to run an entire slate in March of 
1970 at Local 3.  The ELRUM strike effort resulted in five permanent firings (four ELRUM 
members and one close white ally) and 8-10 fire/rehires, while the DRUM managed to send 
only two slated candidate to runoff elections, winning neither. Not long after, the League 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 James A. Geschwender, Class, Race, & Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary 
Black Workers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 182. 
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ceased direct involvement in local elections (the subsequent ELRUM elections were 
endorsements rather than direct involvement) and strike action.  The question remains, was 
the tactical switch made because James Forman and his followers had taken the reins and 
forged new path or had powerful forms of repression and resource deprivation from multiple 
points forced the League to retreat to volatile community work that offered more resources 
and faced less repression?  While it seems likely that both factors had an effect, this tracing 
suggests that the League’s tactical shift was given impetus by foreclosure of other options. 
The ideological conflict and factionalism that fractured the league occurred after this tactical 
shift. 
It wouldn’t be difficult to imagine a different scenario.  If the UAW had functioned as 
an organ of workers’ struggle against exploitative labor conditions, rather than an auxiliary to 
capital in the pursuit of profit5, and honestly pursued its verbal commitment to racial 
egalitarianism, the League would have had a crucial ally in its struggle.  Under these 
conditions, the League could have enjoyed the following advantages: fewer resources would 
have been used contesting UAW racism; workers fired and suspended could have expected 
vigorous union pursuit of grievances and thus weaker punishments, back pay, and more 
autonomy and influence within the plants; League slates would have been able to compete in 
fair elections, resulting in access to “legitimized power” within the locals leading to access to 
further financial and human resources. The League’s trajectory of influence and power 
within the plants and the locals would have been increasing rather than diminishing.  A 
mobilized and active movement with increasing influence would not have had to make a 
severely constrained tactical decision between plant and community organizing, and would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  refers	  to	  Reuther’s	  “Treaty	  of	  Detroit”	  as	  referenced	  on	  page	  28,	  wherein	  the	  UAW	  gave	  up	  control	  of	  the	  shop	  floor	  in	  exchange	  for	  wage	  and	  benefit	  gains.	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have had a local base adequate to enable national expansion.  The material constraints that 
made ideological conflict within the League so pressing would have been substantially 
relaxed.  The UAW’s decisively negative response to the League, more so than the 
companies or the state, played a crucial role in the trajectory and eventual demobilization of 
the League. 
*** 
A few other notes should be made here. Although it wasn’t the focus of this thesis, 
the League’s history can help activists and organizers learn about difficulties movements face 
attempting to simultaneously combat multiple points of oppression, especially race and class.  
Race and class, although intimately related, should not be subsumed into one another.  This 
subsumption is problematic especially among predominantly white socialist, communist, and 
Marxist organizations that run along strict ideological lines.  Ideological rigidity in such 
organizations limits their ability to act in solidarity with (rather than subsume) organizations 
that have similar goals, but differing ideologies that may generate new and dynamic ways to 
target oppression. 
In a retrospective book (2012) about League Central Committee member Mike 
Hamlin lists eleven concrete accomplishments of the League. They are: 
 
1. We focused the struggle for change on the working class. 
2. We forced the UAW and unions across the country to change their racist 
policies and practices by seeing that black workers had a chance to hold 
office in the union consistent with their numbers in the labor force. 
3. We forced Chrysler management to elevate blacks to supervision and 
management positions. Other large industrial organization saw the 
handwriting on the wall and followed suit. 
4. We educated and mobilized black workers and their allies in a broad fight 
for justice. 
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5. We raised the class-consciousness of young black people in numerous 
cities and got them involved in the black movement. 
6. We broke through and dismissed the shackles that McCarthyism had put 
on leftists and progressives by openly claiming that we were Marxist-
Leninists and that we were ready to fight anybody over that right. 
7. We organized and raised the consciousness of several groups of white 
revolutionaries, progressives and liberals. 
8. We developed a publishing operation that produced newspapers, 
newsletters, pamphlets, and two books. 
9. We organized a well-attended book club that met monthly to discuss 
radical and revolutionary books. Lecturers at the discussions were often 
authors of the books. 
10. We developed a movie production unit that produced the film, “Finally 
Got the News” that is still in circulation 40 years later, including use in 
many black studies, sociology and history classes at the university level. 
11. The successes that we had brought about preemptive change in workplaces 
across the country.6 
 
While the League may have been short lived and may not have accomplished its most 
grandiose goals, it can serve as an educational and aspirational lesson for activists 
everywhere.  It must be judged not only by the material gains that it won but also by the 
justice of its fight against exploitative and oppressive material conditions.  It should not be 
judged solely by its ideological schisms but also by its willingness to traverse ideological 
contradictions that it had no part in creating through militant mobilization.  Activists, even in 
the dimmest of times, must find a way to continue to struggle, and heed, as the League of 
Revolutionary Black Workers did, Frantz Fanon’s counsel “Each generation must, out of 
relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it.”7
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